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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from final orders of the Career Service
Review Board pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the Career Service Review Board (the "CSRB") correctly determine

that there was insufficient evidence to support discipline of Trooper John Pace for failing
to follow the Department of Public Safety's (the "Department) vehicular pursuit policy?
An administrative body's decision applying the facts at hand to the law is reviewed
under an intermediate standard of review and must be upheld so long as it is reasonable
and rational. Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985); Utah Dept of
Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). If the administrative body is
not in a better position than is the Court to give effect to the regulatory objective to be
achieved, however, the decision is reviewed for correctness. Despain, 824 P.2d at 443.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or statutes.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The CSRB does not disagree with the Department's Statement of the Case.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The Utah Department of Public Safety disciplined Trooper Ross Pace, a 21-year
veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, for not following the Department's vehicular pursuit
policy. R. 035-36. Although the Department initially charged Trooper Pace with seven
1

counts of misconduct, the Department only appeals the CSRB decision finding
insufficient evidence to sustain the charge that Trooper Pace violated the Department's
pursuit policy. R. 036-45; Pet Brief at 1-2.
The Department's administrative law judge, after hearing evidence and argument,
could only find evidence to fully sustain four of seven charges against Trooper Pace, and
partially sustain one other charge. R. 036-45. He did sustain the charge that Trooper
Pace violated the Department's pursuit policy. R. 037-38. The Department's
administrative law judge therefore recommended that Trooper Pace be suspended for
thirty days without pay. R. 049. This conclusion was based, in part, on the fact that the
incidents in question occurred in a brief nine-month period of time and that Trooper Pace
had a very good record for 21 years with the Department. R. 049. The Executive
Director of the Department considered the recommendation to suspend Trooper Pace for
thirty days, but reduced it to twenty days, ordered a fitness-for-duty examination, and
transferred him to a new section. R. 034.
Trooper Pace appealed the decision to suspend his employment to the CSRB. R.
001. A CSRB hearing officer, after hearing testimony and considering the evidence,
concluded that substantial evidence existed to support the conclusion that the
Department's imposed discipline was appropriate. R. 174. With respect to the vehicular
pursuit charge, the hearing officer conceded that "the testimony relating to this particular
incident, as well as high speed pursuits in general, was somewhat confusing, and at times
conflicting." R. 175. The hearing officer, however, found that Trooper Pace violated the
2

Department's pursuit policy and that discipline was properly imposed. R. 176.
Trooper Pace appealed the hearing officer's decision to the CSRB. R. 199. After
considering briefs of both parties and conducting a hearing, the CSRB unanimously
agreed to overturn the hearing officer's decision with respect to the vehicular pursuit
incident and one of the other incidents. R. 241-247, 256. It remanded the case and
instructed the hearing officer to "make a decision based upon corrected facts as set forth
in this ruling." R. 256. The CSRB concluded, based on the evidence, that "the
Department policies, rules or procedures were incorrectly applied to the facts associated
with [the vehicular pursuit] charge . . . ." R. 246. Specifically, the CSRB found that
"[w]ith respect to the evidence presented at the CSRB evidentiary hearing, the evidence
supports Appellant's position that he did not believe he was involved in a high speed
pursuit because he was unsure, until the very last moment whether the subject he was
following was attempting to avoid apprehension or that he was refusing to stop for
[Trooper Pace]." R. 0245.
Upon rehearing, the hearing officer imposed a one-day suspension without pay,
but no discipline related to the vehicular pursuit charge. R. 261. The Department
appealed the hearing officer's decision on remand. R. 263.
Upon reconsideration, the CSRB sustained the hearing officer's decision on
remand. R. 314. At the request of the Department, the CSRB reconsidered the vehicular
pursuit charge and reaffirmed its prior decision. R. 314. The CSRB found "no legal
justification to reverse its prior decision with respect to [the vehicular pursuit allegation] J
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R. 311. The CSRB also reiterated the basis for its decision: "[t]he [vehicular pursuit]
policy relied upon by the Department clearly provides that it is not until an officer
involved in chase makes a subjective determination that the individual they are chasing is
attempting to avoid apprehension or refusing to stop that they may initiate a pursuit." R.
312 (emphasis in original). The Department now appeals the CSRETs decision that found
no justification for discipline of Trooper Pace for the alleged violation of the
Department's vehicular pursuit policy.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Contrary to the Department's assertions, the issue is not one of a simple question
of law. The CSRB considered all the evidence before it and found that there was
insufficient evidence to support discipline of Trooper Pace on the charge that he violated
the Department's vehicular pursuit policy. The CSRB concluded that the Department's
policy grants discretion to a trooper to determine when a vehicular pursuit is initiated or
takes place and, coupled with the evidence before it, Trooper Pace did not engage in a
vehicular pursuit. Accordingly, because no pursuit took place, the Department could not
discipline Trooper Pace for failing to follow procedures only required after a pursuit is
initiated. The CSRB's decision in this respect was reasonable, rational, and correct
ARGUMENT
L

THE DEPARTMENT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT ITS POSITION.
It is well understood that a party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
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record evidence that supports the challenged finding. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). As the
Court has previously pointed out:
[i]n order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
[challenging party] must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced . . . which supports the very
findings the [challenging party] resists. After constructing this magnificent
array of supporting evidence, the [challenging party] must ferret out a fatal
flaw in the evidence.
West Valley City v. Majestic In v. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Rather than marshal the evidence, the Department selects one passage of give-andtake between the Department's attorney and one member of the Career Service Review
Board (the "CSRB") during oral argument on reconsideration and argues the issue on
appeal is purely a legal one. Based on this passage, the Department argues that the CSRB
wrongly "read into the definition of what constituted a vehicular pursuit a discretion on
the part of the officer to determine what did or did not meet the definition." Pet. Brief at
9. This passage, however, is not the final ruling on appeal, and cannot be used by the
Department to convert what is an issue of law and fact into a question of law only.
Rather, the evidence, when considered as a whole, shows the CSRB's application of the
law to the facts is reasonable and rational.
IL

THE CSRB'S DECISION THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VEHICULAR PURSUIT CHARGE WAS
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL.
A.

The CSRB's decision is entitled to deference and must be upheld
because it was reasonable and rational.

Utah Administrative Rules set forth the responsibility of the CSRB in reviewing a
5

hearing officer's decision. Rule R137-l-22(4)(a) provides that, upon appeal from a
hearing officer's decision, the CSRB "shall first make a determination whether the factual
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the
substantial evidence standard." If the CSRB determines that the hearing officer's factual
findings are not reasonable and rational based on the record as a whole, then the CSRB
may "correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings." Utah
Admin. Code R137-l-22(4)(a). The CSRB did precisely that.
The CSRB, when reviewing a departmental action, is charged with determining
"whether there is a factual support for the Department's charges against [the employee]
and, if so, whether the Department's sanction of dismissal is so disproportionate to those
charges that it amounts to an abuse of discretion." Id. at 443. Accordingly, "[w]hether an
employee is appropriately [disciplined] for 'just cause,' under agency standards, is a
question of applying the facts to the administrative scheme within the purview of the
CSRB." Id.
Like the administrative standard of review, Utah appellate courts have applied a
similar standard in reviewing CSRB decisions, and have given its conclusions similar
deference. See e.g., Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App.
1991). An appellate court, when reviewing a CSRB decision, "must determine whether
the CSRB, 'by virtue of its experience or expertise, is in a better position that [is the
court] to give effect to the regulatory objective to be achieved.'" Id. (quoting Morton
Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah
6

1991)). If the answer is yes, then the court is limited to reviewing the CSRB's decision to
see "if it was reasonable or rational." Despain, 824 P.2d at 443. If the answer is no, then
a court must review the decision for correctness. Id.
The CSRB is specifically and solely charged with reviewing state and public
employee grievances and discipline matters relating to suspensions, wages, salary, and
violations of personnel rules. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202. Given this expertise,
the Court is limited to reviewing the CSRB's decision to see if it was reasonable and
rational.
B.

The CSRB correctly applied the Department's pursuit policy when if found
no basis to support discipline of Trooper Pace

The Department points out that Trooper Pace "was not charged with making a
poor decision in initiating a vehicular pursuit. The charge against Pace was that he
initiated a vehicular pursuit, as that term is defined by the policy, without complying with
the policy's requirements." Pet. Brief at 8. Throughout, the Department has never fully
examined the threshold question of whether a pursuit actually even occurred. Rather, the
Department has attempted to discipline Trooper Pace for violating policy after an alleged
pursuit had been initiated. If there is no pursuit, however, the Department's vehicular
pursuit policy is inapplicable and Trooper Pace cannot be disciplined for failing to
employ post-initiation procedures.
The Department's vehicular pursuit policy provides: "[s]worn officers of the
department shall conduct pursuits in compliance with 41-6-14 UCA, sound professional
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judgement, and the procedures outlined in this policy." R.57 (attached hereto as
Addendum "A"). The policy defines a "vehicular pursuit" as "[a]n active attempt by an
officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend fleeing suspects who are
attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive and unlawful tactics." R. 59.
The Department's procedures in relation to vehicular pursuits provide:
A.

Initiation of Pursuit:
1.

Any law enforcement officer in a department vehicle
with operable emergency vehicle equipment and radio
may initiate a vehicular pursuit when the following
criteria are met:
a.

The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension
through evasive or unlawful tactics.

b.

The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the
direction of the officer.

c.

The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue would
further enhance the danger presented to the public.
*

3.

*

*

The pursuing officer shall consider the following factors in
determining whether to begin or continue a pursuit:
a.

The performance capabilities of the pursuit vehicle;

b.

The condition of the road surface upon which the pursuit is
being conducted;

c.

The amount of vehicular and pedestrian traffic in the area;

d.

The weather conditions;

e.

The offense for. which the subject will be pursued;
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f.

Any potential or existing hazards;

h.

Familiarity with the area and road; and

L

Any other pertinent factors.

R. 059-060. The threshold question, as it appeared to the CSRB, was whether Trooper
Pace actually initiated a vehicular pursuit. It he did not, then there is no basis for the
Department's discipline. If he did, then there is a basis for the Department's discipline
only if he abused his discretion in initiating a pursuit and failed to follow applicable
policy following initiation of the pursuit.
Because the Department's policy provides that a trooper may actively attempt to
apprehend fleeing suspects, the CSRB read the policy to grant a trooper discretion based
upon a trooper's subjective considerations to initiate a pursuit. In the CSRB's words, the
"policy relied upon by the Department clearly provides that it is not until an officer
involved in chase makes a subjective determination that the individual they are chasing is
attempting to avoid apprehension or refusing to stop that they may initiate a pursuit." R.
312.
The CSRB's application of the policy is supported by the policy itself. The policy
provides subjective considerations in determining whether a vehicular pursuit is or is not
taking place. It provides, for example, factors such as "an active attempt," "fleeing
suspects," and "attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive and unlawful tactics."
A trooper will always necessarily be requited to make a judgment call as to when a
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particular suspect is actively attempting to flee and avoid apprehension through evasive
and unlawful tactics.
The Department conceded at oral argument before the CSRB that there is
discretion afforded a trooper by policy in initiating a pursuit. R. 316 at 9. But then the
Department maintains that every time a trooper exceeds the speed limit and activates his
emergency lights he engages in a vehicular pursuit subject to the policy. R. 316 at 25-26.
This application of the pursuit policy is unreasonable. If a trooper makes a subjective
determination not to initiate a pursuit, there is no basis for discipline unless the
Department finds that a trooper abused his discretion in engaging in conduct that
evidenced a pursuit. Based on the facts presented, the CSRB correctly found that Trooper
Pace did not initiate a vehicular pursuit. Accordingly, the Department inappropriately
disciplined Trooper Pace for failing to follow a Department policy that only applied after
initiation of a pursuit

C

The facts compel the conclusion that Trooper Pace did not engage in a
vehicular pursuit.

The Department initially sought to terminate Trooper Pace based, in part, on
alleged failure to properly apply Department policy in a singular incident involving one
speeding vehicle. The credible and substantial evidence before the CSRB, however,
establishes that Trooper Pace never made the subjective determination required by policy
and therefore never initiated a pursuit. R. 0312.
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Trooper Pace testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not know whether the
suspect was "fleeing" or "attempting to avoid apprehension," because, in part, the suspect
was continuously three-quarters to one mile ahead of him until the suspect pulled into a
rest area. R. 202 at 331-34. Trooper Pace and others who testified pointed out that it is
not an uncommon occurrence to "chase down speeders" without implicating the pursuit
policy. R. 316 at 57-59.
In addition, the evidence before the CSRB showed that the suspect was traveling at
a high rate of speed through a winding canyon road with numerous visual obstacles.
When Trooper Pace first saw the speeding motorist, he was traveling in the opposite
direction and had to cross the center median before chasing the suspect. R. 241, 202 at
328. Rather than continuing at high rates of speed for several miles, the suspect pulled
over at a rest stop ten miles after passing Trooper Pace. R. 88, 241, 202 at 331. Based on
his 21-years of experience, Trooper Pace was of the opinion that he did not initiate a
pursuit, but only sped-up in an attempt to catch up with the suspect. R. 316 at 57-59, 202
at 333-34.
The CSRB gave substantial weight to Trooper Pace's testimony. See e.g., R. 310.
Trooper Pace, no doubt, was acutely aware of the vehicular pursuit policy, had engaged in
pursuits previously, and knew the difference between a pursuit subject to the policy and
speeding up merely to initiate a stop of a speeding motorist. See e.g., R. 316 at 59
(testifying that he had engaged in at least six prior high-speed pursuits). The CSRB
agreed with Trooper Pace that in virtually every instance of a speeding motorist a trooper
11

does not know a motorist's reaction, and that in most instances a trooper must travel
faster than the motorist to catch up and initiate a stop. See R. 244, This incident was no
exception.
Based on this testimony, the CSRB ruled that the Department could not discipline
Trooper Pace for failing to follow policies required after the initiation of a pursuit,
including contacting dispatch and calling for additional assistance. The CSRB's rationale
for its decision is summarized by the following excerpt from its written ruling:
The Respondent's actions with respect to this incident simply do not, in and
of themselves, establish that he was involved in a high speed pursuit
pursuant to DPS policy 1-21 V, This is especially true when one closely
examines the facts of this case. The record establishes that the pursuit
occurred on a curvy, mountain road. The individual that Respondent was
chasing was approximately three-quarters to one mile ahead of him during
most of the pursuit. Because of these conditions, Respondent testified that
there were long periods of time when he lost complete visual contact with
the car he was chasing. Finally, Respondent testified that during most of
this chase, he, himself, was not certain whether the suspect knew he was
being pursued by Respondent and thus trying to avoid apprehension, or if
the suspect was simply continuing to travel at a very high rate of speed,
unaware of Respondent's pursuit.
R. 311. If there is no pursuit, as the CSRB concluded, then there is no basis for
discipline. Given Trooper Pace's experience, the credible evidence of the incident itself,
and a correct application of the Department's pursuit policy to the facts, it was rational
and reasonable for the CSRB to conclude that Trooper Pace did not initiate a vehicular
pursuit. Accordingly, there is no basis to discipline Trooper Pace for a not following
post-initiation procedures.
The Department argues that the second-hand review and commentary of the
12

incident by Lieutenant Bardell Hamilton, Sergeant Jeff Peterson, Trooper Steven R.
Bytheway, and Officer Richard Henning all support the conclusion that Trooper Pace
engaged in a vehicular pursuit. The evidence before the CSRB is anything but a clear
indictment of Trooper Pace. The hearing officer herself pointed out that "[t]he testimony
relating to this particular incident, as well as high speed pursuits in general, was
somewhat confusing, and at times conflicting." R. 175.
Although Trooper Steven Bytheway was of the opinion that Trooper Pace likely
did initiate a pursuit, he testified that if an officer is trying to catch up with a speeding
vehicle that there is no policy to notify dispatch because the vehicular pursuit policy
would be inapplicable. R. 175-76. Trooper Paul Brown testified that, based on the
evidence, Trooper Pace did not initiate a pursuit. R. 175-76. Like Trooper Bytheway, he
also acknowledged that speed alone is not determinative of a pursuit, and that it is
possible to issue a citation for evasion, as Trooper Pace did, without having engaged in a
pursuit. R. 175-76, 202 at 263-64. In fact, Trooper Bytheway, a 22-year veteran of the
Department, testified that a pursuit is initiated only when an officer is "right behind a
vehicle with the lights activated," and that the "violator must know that you are chasing
him and fails to stop." R. 175, 202 at 285-86. Similarly, Colonel Greenwood testified
that an officer should initiate a pursuit if the officer believes the violator is not responding.
R. 177. The CSRB, after reviewing the testimony of the above witnesses concluded that
"all testified that it is the officer involved in the chase that makes the discretionary
decision of whether to initiate a 'pursuit' under Department policy." R. 310. Trooper
13

Pace did not initiate a pursuit because he was unaware of the suspects intention or
knowledge of Trooper Pace's actions to stop him. See R. 316 at 58.
The other witnesses that testified that Trooper Pace did initiate a pursuit, all did so
based exclusively on the written report filled out by Trooper Pace well after the incident.
As the CSRB concluded:
it is largely non-dispositive that after reviewed the incident report, a
"majority of the witnesses" believed [Trooper Pace] was involved in a high
speed pursuit. Reliance on this testimony fails to address the discretionary
element of Department policy that allows the trooper involved in the
incident to make the determination of whether to initiate a pursuit. This
discretion must first be exercised before any of the other provisions of the
pursuit policy came into play.
R. 245 (attached hereto as Addendum "B"). At a minimum, the testimony produced at
the hearing demonstrates that the Department's pursuit policy is anything but clear and
that there are conflicting ideas as to what is a pursuit in violation of policy, or even when
an incident becomes a pursuit subject to the policy's procedures. The CSRB reasonably
concluded that the definition of a pursuit allows discretion on the part of the officer and,
given this discretion, there was no pursuit based on the facts presented.
D.

The CSRB's decision will have no effect on the ability of the Department to
enforce its pursuit policy.

Contrary to the Department's claims, the CSRB's decision in this case does not
render its pursuit policy unenforceable. If the Department fears that its policy is
unenforceable, it is only because of the policy's ambiguities, not the CSRB's application
of the policy to this set of facts. The CSRB only acknowledges what the Department
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must admit: whether a pursuit takes place is a case-by-case determination based on an
application of the policy to the particular facts. If the facts relating to when a vehicular
pursuit is initiated are irrelevant, then there would be no need for a Pursuit Review Board
to determine if a particular trooper had indeed engaged in a pursuit. The Pursuit Review
Board would only be required to determine whether a trooper followed policy after
initiation of a pursuit.
In this case the Pursuit Review Board never made any findings or conclusions that
Trooper Pace had engaged in a pursuit; It simply assumed that one had taken place and
dedicated its entire written decision to whether Trooper Pace had followed applicable
pursuit procedures after initiating a pursuit. With respect to the Pursuit Review Board,
the CSRB noted:
[its] findings are that [Trooper Pace] violated the provisions of the pursuit
policy that are required only after the pursuing officer determines that he is
involved in a pursuit, i.e., unit identification, location, description, and
reason for initiating pursuit. The Pursuit Board concluded that by not giving
dispatch this information, he was placing himself and others in harm's way.
As stated previously, these required procedures come into effect only
after a trooper makes a subjective decision that he or she is involved in the
pursuit. Until such time as the trooper makes that determination, none of
these policies or procedures outlined by the Pursuit Board come into play.
The Pursuit Board findings and analysis are therefore not persuasive in
determining whether [Trooper Pace] violated the Department's pursuit
policy with respect to this incident.
R. 246. Accordingly, the CSRB placed no reliance on the Pursuit Review Board's
finding. Instead, it relied upon the credible and compelling evidence before it.
Simply because a trooper has the discretion as to whether engage in a vehicular
15

pursuit does not make the policy unenforceable. It will require, however, that the
Department examine the actions of the trooper and the facts surrounding the incident to
determine whether the trooper abused her discretion in deciding whether or not to initiate
a vehicular pursuit. If the Department finds that the trooper did abuse her discretion, then
it may impose discipline for this abuse of discretion. The Department, however, wants to
discipline Trooper Pace for not following policy after initiating a pursuit, without having
to examine whether Trooper Pace actually initiated a vehicular pursuit

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court should affirm the CSRB's decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ d a y of December, 2003.

JOBL/A. FERRE
MARK E. BURNS
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Respondent
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Brent Burnett
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A
Department's Pursuit Policy

STATE OF UTAH
Department of Public Safety

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
| SUBJECT:

I.

REF

PAGE

1-21
EFFECTIVE DATE

3/1/87

1 of 1 6

I

REVISION DATE

7/28/98

I

PURSUIT POLICY

PURPOSE
To establish guidelines regarding the pursuit and apprehension of violators of
the criminal law by department law enforcement personnel.

II.

LEGAL DISCLAIMER
This policy is for departmental use only and does not apply to any criminal or
civil proceeding. This policy shall not be construed as creating a higher
standard of care or safety in an evidentiary sense with respect to third party
claims. Violations of this policy will form the basis of departmental
administrative sanctions only.

III.

POLICY
Vehicular pursuit of fleeing suspects presents danger to the public, officers, and
suspects involved in the pursuit. It is the policy of this department to protect all
persons and property to the extent reasonably possible when enforcing the law.
In addition, it is the responsibility of the department to assist officers in the safe
performance of their duties. It is the policy of the department to regulate the
manner in which vehicular pursuit is undertaken and performed.
Sworn officers of the department shall conduct pursuits in compliance with Title
41-6-14 UCA, sound professional judgement, and the procedures outlined in
this policy.

IV.

DEFINITIONS
A.

Back-up Unit: Police units assisting the primary unit.

B.

Boxinq-in: A technique designed to stop a violator's vehicle by
surrounding it with law enforcement vehicles and then slowing all
vehicles to a stop.

tS
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Policy Number 1-21
Pursuit Policy
Page 2 of 16

C.

Channelization: A technique similar to a roadblock where objects are
placed in the anticipated (or actual) path of a pursued vehicle, which tend
to alter the vehicles intended direction of travel.

D.

Department: Utah Department of Public Safety.

E.

Due Regard: The consideration of existing circumstances to determine
the validity of one's actions as they relate to existing or potential
hazards.

F.

Emergency Vehicle Equipment: All emergency equipment available, to
include: red and blue lights, siren, and headlights.

G.

Paralleling: Participating in the pursuit by proceeding in the same
direction and maintaining approximately the same speed while traveling
on an alternate street or highway that parallels the pursuit route.

H.

Primary Unit: The officer initiating the pursuit or the officer w h o assumes
the role of managing the pursuit in the event that the original officer is
unable to continue the pursuit.

I.

Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT): A forced stop by a pursuing officer
in which the side of a suspect's vehicle is pushed by the officer's vehicle;
thereby, causing the suspect's vehicle to rotate into a position where it
can be trapped by back-up officers.

J.

Ramming: When deadly force is warranted the deliberate act of
impacting a violator's vehicle with another vehicle to functionally damage
or otherwise force the violator's vehicle to stop.

K.

Reasonable Care: The degree of care which an officer of ordinary
prudence would exercise in the same or similar circumstances.

L.

Reasonably Necessary: The immediate danger to the public created by
the pursuit is less than the immediate risk to the public should the pursuit
not continue.

M.

Roadblock: When deadly force is warranted establishing a physical
impediment to traffic as a means for stopping a vehicle using actual
physical obstructions, or barricades.

fin*^
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V.

N.

Termination of Pursuit: Notify dispatch that the pursuit is being
terminated, pull to the right shoulder of the highway, and turn off lights
and siren.

0.

Tire Deflating Device: Tire deflating spikes utilized to deflate a suspect
vehicle tires.

P.

Unmarked Vehicle: A law enforcement vehicle that does not display
department insignias, but has an operable red light and siren.

Q.

Vehicular Pursuit: An active attempt by an officer in an authorized
emergency vehicle to apprehend fleeing suspects who are attempting to
avoid apprehension through evasive and unlawful tactics.

PROCEDURES
A.

Initiation of Pursuit:
1.

Any law enforcement officer in a department vehicle with operable
emergency vehicle equipment and radio may initiate a vehicular
pursuit when the following criteria are met:
a.

The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension
through evasive or unlawful tactics.

b.

The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the
direction of the officer.

c«

The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue would
further enhance the danger presented to the public.

2.

Department vehicles that do not possess operable emergency
vehicle equipment and an operable police radio will not be involved
in a pursuit.

3-

The pursuing officer shall consider the following factors in
determining whether to begin or continue a pursuit:
aw

The performance capabilities of the pursuit vehicle;

b.

The condition of the road surface upon which the pursuit is
being conducted;

nn^o
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B.

c.

The amount of vehicular and pedestrian traffic in the area;

d.

The weather conditions;

e.

The offense for which the subject will be pursued;

f.

Any potential or existing hazards;

h.

Familiarity with the area and road; and

i.

Any other pertinent factors.

Unmarked units and motorcycle officers will relinquish the pursuit
to a marked unit as soon as practical.

Pursuit Officer Responsibilities:
1•

The pursuing officer shall activate headlights and all emergency
equipment upon initiating pursuit.

2.

The pursuing officer shall immediately notify communications
center personnel that a pursuit is underway. Use of plain English
transmissions is encouraged, rather than using the ten-code. The
officer shall provide communications center personnel with the
following information:

3.

a.

Unit identification;

b.

Location, speed, and direction of travel of the fleeing
vehicle;

c.

Description and license plate number, if known of the
pursued vehicle;

d.

Number of occupants in the fleeing vehicle, including
descriptions, where possible; and

e.

Reason for initiating the pursuit.

Officers engaged in pursuit shall at all times drive in a manner
exercising reasonable care for the safety of themselves and all
other persons and property within the pursuit area.

nncn

Officers are permitted to suspend conformance with normal traffic
regulations during pursuit as long as reasonable care is used when
driving in a manner not otherwise permitted, and the maneuver is
reasonably necessary to gain control of the suspect.
No other unit should engage in the pursuit until requested by a
supervisor, or the initiating officer if no supervisor is available.
Back-up units shall be limited to one unit unless otherwise
specified by a supervisor or the initiating officer if no supervisor is
available.
All units involved in the pursuit should, when practical, operate on
the statewide radio channel.
The primary unit, when possible, shall control tactical operations
and will be responsible for broadcasting radio communications,
unless he delegates that responsibility to a back-up unit.
No unit shall pass another unit involved in the pursuit unless
specifically requested to do so or it is otherwise considered
necessary.
There shall be no pursuit intervention technique or boxing-in of the
pursued vehicle unless, based on the existing circumstance, the
use of that force would be justified and the use of a tire deflating
device has been considered. Caution should be used while making
physical contact w i t h any suspect vehicle since air bag activation
may occur.
There shall be no units paralleling the pursuit route.
All units shall maintain an adequate following distance to ensure
adequate reaction and braking time.
When approaching or entering an intersection controlled by a
semaphore or a stop sign, all officers shall slow their vehicle to a
speed considered reasonable and which would allow them to bring
the- vehicle to a complete stop at a red light or sign prior to
entering the intersection, if necessary. If the light is green,
officers shall slow the vehicle to a speed that is consistent with
reasonable care.
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14.

15.

VI.

Officers shall not discharge a firearm at or from a moving vehicle
unless the use of deadly force is justified and both of the following
requirements can be met:
a.

There is a substantial likelihood that the projectile will not
strike any person other than the suspect.

b.

The risk of the suspect vehicle going out of control after
being hit is less than the risk of the suspect not being
captured immediately.

The primary pursuit unit or supervisor shall reduce the level of
pursuit to that of support or back-up unit where:
a.

The fleeing vehicle comes under the surveillance of an air
unit; or

b.

Another vehicle has been assigned primary pursuit
responsibility.

16.

Any primary or back-up unit sustaining damage that would
jeopardize safe operation, or a failure of essential radio, vehicular,
or emergency equipment during pursuit, necessitates a
discontinuation of the pursuit by the disabled vehicle. The unit
shall notify the communications center, if possible.

17.

Officers shall not engage in high speed pursuits when their vehicle
is occupied by prisoners, suspects, complainants, witnesses or any
other persons not a sworn peace officer. This restriction applies
whether or not the passenger has signed a waiver of liability.

18.

An officer shall not follow a violator who proceeds the wrong
direction on any roadway or highway.

CHANNELIZATION - DEFINITION AND UTILIZATION
Channelization may be used to redirect or stop a pursued vehicle. The selection
of the best method and area in each circumstance should be preceded by an
evaluation of alKactors surrounding the individual pursuit. The methods used
should offer the greatest probability of success with the least likelihood of injury
to the general public, the officer, and the suspect.
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Officers may deliberately direct a vehicle into a given path or location (ie.,
unpaved roadway, dead end road, away from populated areas or intersections,
etc.) by using stationary objects (Pylons, barricades, vehicles) placed in the
current path of the pursued vehicle. This method also may be used to direct a
pursued vehicle toward and across a hollow spike strip.
Channelization is considered a forcible stop technique, but does not require the
justification of deadly force.
VII.

TIRE DEFLATING DEVICES
The use of tire deflating devices will be governed by sound professional
judgment and the procedures outlined in this policy. Should allied agencies
request to utilize department owned tire deflating devices, they are expected to
comply with the contents of this policy.
A.

B.

The following criteria shall be met prior to the use of tire deflating
devices:
1.

There is reasonable cause to believe the suspect has committed an
offense justifying arrest of the suspect.

2.

The officer attempting to apprehend the suspect had given notice
of command to stop to the suspect by means of both a red light
and siren.

3-

The suspect ignores the efforts and warnings obvious and visible
to a reasonable person in the suspect's position.

Officers involved in using tire deflating devices will consider the following
prior to utilizing this equipment.
1.

Before utilizing tire deflating devices officers should have received
training on the use of the devices.

2.

Most effective location for the placement of tire deflating devices.
a.

Deployment locations should have reasonably good sight
distances to enable the person deploying the devices to
observe the pursuit and other traffic as it approaches.

O0R°
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b.

The person deploying the tire deflating devices should
choose a location with natural barriers such as roadway
overpasses, guardrail, or shrubbery. These barriers will
conceal the person from the violator's view and allow
deployment of the devices in a relative position of safety.

c.

Traffic, construction, special events, and/or activities may
create situations where the use of tire deflating devices
would be inappropriate.

Position and vulnerability of the public, private property, other
assisting units, and equipment.
a-

b-

Tire deflating devices should not be deployed to stop the
following vehicles unless continued movement of the
pursued vehicle would result in an increased hazard to
others:
1.

Any vehicle transporting hazardous materials.

2.

Any passenger bus transporting passengers.

3.

Any school bus transporting students.

4.

Any vehicle that would pose an unusual hazard to
innocent parties.

5.

Any two-wheel vehicles, unless deadly force is
justified.

Tire deflating device deployment plans should include
provisions for close coordination between pursuing units
and the person deploying the spikes.
1.

When the decision is made to deploy the tire
deflating device, pursuing units will notify the person
deploying the devices as far in advance as possible,
of the necessity of their use.

2.

The person deploying the tire deflating device shall
be in position at a predetermined location in time for
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Policy Number 1-21
Pursuit Policy
Page 9 of 16

proper deployment. All pursuing units should be
notified when the devices are in place.
3.

VIII.

The tire deflating device will be deployed in
accordance with the manufacturer's
recommendations:
a.

The recommended method is to pull the
devices across the roadway with the provided
rope.

b.

To quickly unwind the rope from the spool,
undo several turns of rope, then holding the
rope in your hand, drop the spool. While
walking, let the rope slip through your hand.
The spool will most generally unwind while
dangling as you walk.

c.

The effectiveness of the tire deflating devices
will be increased if they are placed across the
roadway at an angle so that the rocker arms
are lined up squarely with the fleeing vehicle
tires. However, the spikes will work very well
if placed straight across the roadway.

d.

Do not engage in physical contact with the
rope or devices while they are being run over.

4.

After deploying the tire deflating devices, everyone at
the scene should immediately seek protection.

5.

The person(s) deploying the device is/are responsible
for securing them immediately after their use. This
will include searching the immediate area where the
device was used and collecting any spikes which
may have become detached, properly maintaining,
preparing for reuse, and storing the spikes.

BOXING-IN (FORCIBLE STOP)
The use of boxing-in as a technique for terminating pursuits is discouraged,
under ordinary circumstances, the potential hazard outweighs the probability of
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a successful stop of a violator. Therefore, this technique should only be used at
slow speeds or where the obvious risks can be eliminated or appreciably
reduced.
A.

Boxing-in could be considered as a method to stop a suspect vehicle in
situations where slower speeds are being used by the subject, and other
methods of stopping the subject (tire deflating devices) are not possible.
In any case where boxing-in is used care should be taken by the officer or
officers in front and on the side of the subject. If at any time the subject
attempts to assault an officer while the boxing-in technique is being
employed, the officers pursuing the subject should consider and use
alternative methods to stop the subject.

IX.

B.

Boxing-in shall not be used at high speeds or in those circumstances
where the pursued subject has demonstrated a willingness to assault an
officer either with the vehicle or some other means, i.e., a firearm. In
such cases, other means should be used to stop the subject.

C.

Boxing-in shall not be used when it is necessary to use citizens to effect
the maneuver.

PIT
The Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT) is a forced rotational non-compliant
vehicle stop that should be used at a reasonable speed not to exceed 45 mph.
This technique should be used when all other reasonable means of apprehension
have been considered and rejected as impractical, e.g., air support, allied agency
assistance, tire deflating devices, or boxing-in; when the apparent risk of harm,
to other than the occupants of the pursued vehicle, is so great as to outweigh
the risk of harm in making the forcible stop; when the pursuing officer believes
that continued movement of the pursued vehicle would place others in danger
of great bodily harm or death. Use care and caution in selecting the location
where the stop is to be made, so that any resulting danger can be minimized as
much as possible.
The PIT maneuver is performed \Q the following manner:
A.

The patrol car approaches suspect's vehicle from behind. Care should be
taken from this point on, because the patrol car will be moving into a
potential "strike zone."
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B.

The patrol car accelerates until the front of the patrol car is even with the
left or right rear quarter panel of the suspect's vehicle.

C.

The patrol car must match the speed of the suspect's vehicle.

D.

The patrol car drifts over and gently makes contact between the rear
wheel well and bumper of the suspect's vehicle.

E.

As soon as contact is made, the officer must turn the steering wheel
smoothly (a little more than a quarter of a turn) in the direction of the
suspect's vehicle.

F.

The officer will immediately accelerate, rotating the rear of the suspect's
vehicle over 25 degrees. Loss of control of the suspect's vehicle is
irreversible.

G.

The officer will straighten the wheel of the patrol car, release the
•accelerator, and continue past the suspect's rotating vehicle.

H.

Do not swerve around or attempt to avoid the suspect's vehicle once the
rotation has begun; it may cause a loss of control of the patrol car.

I.

Back-up patrol cars can block the suspect's escape once the suspect's
vehicle stops.

J.

Finesse should be used in making contact with the suspect's vehicle. If a
hard collision takes place, it may cause deployment of the patrol car's air
bag. If this occurs, the officer should sweep the air bag out of the way
with a clockwise motion of the right arm. Do not touch the inner portion
of the steering wheel - it may cause severe burns.

ROADBLOCKS
Roadblocks are prohibited unless the circumstances would warrant the use of
deadly force. Roadblocks should only be established with a supervisor's
approval. If a roadblock is established officers must:
A.

Allow the suspect vehicle reasonable stopping distance.

B.

Not place themselves or their vehicle in a position that would jeopardize
the safety of the officers involved.
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XII.

C<

Not place their vehicles in a position that is not reasonably visible to the
suspect.

D.

Reasonably ensure the safety of non-involved pedestrians and motorists.

BACK-UP UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES
A.

Back-up units shall abide by the same guidelines as the primary unit
unless not applicable or otherwise directed by a supervisor,

B.

Upon request of the primary unit, or in the event that the primary unit is
disabled or unable to continue the pursuit, the back-up unit shall assume
the responsibilities of the primary unit.

PURSUIT TERMINATION CONSIDERATION
A.

A decision to terminate pursuit may be the most rational means of
preserving the lives and property of the public, the officers and suspects
engaged in pursuit. Pursuit may be terminated by the primary pursuing
officer, or a supervisor. Officers who voluntarily terminate a pursuit
should not be subject to discipline. When the decision to terminate has
been made, that decision should be considered final and not subject to
being overridden by a supervisor or fellow officer except in extenuating
circumstances.

B.

Pursuit should be terminated in any of the following circumstances:
1.

Weather or traffic conditions substantially increase the danger of
pursuit beyond the worth of apprehending the suspect;

2.

The distance between the pursuing and fleeing vehicles is so great
that further pursuit is futile;

3.

The danger posed by continued pursuit to the public, the officers,
or the suspect is greater than the value of apprehending the
suspect(s);

4.

The pursued subject can be positively identified and there is no
longer a need for immediate apprehension;

5.

Visual contact w i t h the pursued vehicle is lost for a significant
amount of time;
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XIII.

6.

A supervisor directs termination of the pursuit;

7.

The officer is unfamiliar with the area and is unable to accurately
notify dispatch of the location and direction of pursuit;

8.

When a violator proceeds the wrong way on a limited access
highway or one way road.

Pursuits will terminate at the state line, unless exigent circumstances
exist.

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
In the event any person is injured during the course of the pursuit, the involved
officer(s) shall immediately provide, or make arrangements for providing medical
care. The care for human life will exceed the importance of capturing a fleeing
suspect in the vast majority of situations. If the pursuit must be continued to
prevent additional deaths or injuries, the pursuing officer(s) must make
arrangements via radio to provide for the victim(s) immediate care.

XIV.

PURSUITS - OTHER AGENCIES OR JURISDICTIONS
A.

Department personnel may not engage in pursuits that are conducted by
other agencies, except in the following circumstances:
1•

Department units are specifically requested by the pursing agency
to assist in the capture of the fleeing suspect.

2.

When only one vehicle from another agency is already in active
pursuit and department officers are instructed by a department
supervisor to assist.

B.

If the pursuing agency is joined by department units and the agency's
back-up unit arrives to assist, department units will terminate active
pursuit, unless otherwise instructed by a supervisor.

C.

DPS officers have statevtfide, concurrent jurisdiction when department
pursuits leave their primary jurisdiction; however, in these circumstance
the following will apply:
1.

The primary officer will advise communications that the pursuit is
entering another agency's jurisdiction,

OOKQ
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XV.

2.

The supervisor or primary officer handling the pursuit will evaluate
the entire incident and make the decision whether to let the pursuit
continue or terminate.

3.

Communications center personnel will notify the involved
jurisdiction.

4.

If the agency with primary jurisdictional authority joins in an active
department pursuit they shall assume the role of back-up units. If
t w o units from the other agency join the pursuit, the DPS primary
unit will consider terminating the department's involvement in the
pursuit, if continuation of the pursuit is not reasonably necessary.

When other agencies become involved in department pursuits within the
primary patrol area of the department, the following shall apply:
1.

Assisting agencies will assume the role of a back-up unit, unless
otherwise directed by the primary DPS officer or supervisor.

2.

The primary DPS unit will, if possible, advise the communications
center of the identity of the other agencies involved so that
communications can make contact and begin coordination with the
involved agency.

3.

Due to limited radio communications w i t h other agencies, the
assigned supervisor or primary officer shall re-evaluate the pursuit
and terminate if necessary.

SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES
A.

After being notified of a department pursuit a supervisor shall:
1.

Ensure proper radio channels and procedures are in use;

2.

Ensure tactics are in conformance w i t h department policy;

3.

Ensure only the necessary number of units are involved;

4.

Ensure allied agencies are notified;

5-

Consider aborting the pursuit if cause exists;
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B.

XVI.

6-

Consider air support availability and practicality;

7.

Ensure post-incident notifications;

8,

Ensure that proper written reports are completed and forwarded to
the section commander.

The supervisor should proceed to the termination point of the pursuit and
provide appropriate assistance and supervision at the scene, when
practical.

MANDATORY COUNSELING
A.

Any officer directly involved in a pursuit resulting in death or serious
bodily injury to any person is required to attend a timely critical incident
debriefing arranged by the bureau commander of the involved officer.

B.

The bureau commander will also schedule a professional psychological
counseling session for any officer directly involved in a pursuit resulting
in death or serious bodily injury to any person. Attendance by the
involved officer at this counseling session is mandatory.

XVII. COMMUNICATION CENTER RESPONSIBILITIES
A.

Upon notification that a pursuit is in progress, communications personnel
shall immediately advise a field supervisor of essential information
regarding the pursuit.

B.

Communications personnel shall also carry out the following
responsibilities during the pursuit:
1•

Receive and record all incoming information on the pursuit and the
pursued vehicle;

2.

Control all radio communications and clear the radio channels of all
non-emergency calls;

3.

Perform relevant record and motor vehicle checks;

4.

Coordinate and dispatch back-up assistance and air support units
under the direction of the field supervisor;
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5.

Notify concurrent and neighboring jurisdictions, where practical,
when the pursuit may extend into their location and specify
whether involvement is requested;

6,

If the pursuit enters a bordering state, that jurisdiction should be
notified.

XVIII. PURSUIT CRITIQUE AND REVIEW

XIX.

A.

A section commander, a first-line supervisor, an uninvolved DPS officer
will conduct a review of each pursuit that occurs in the department as
soon as is practical following the incident. This review shall include
reading comprehensive reports from all personnel involved, compilations
of existing evidence and data related to the incident, and the request for
audio dispatching tapes.

B.

A comprehensive analysis of the pursuit will be prepared by this
committee and the section commander will forward the group's finding to
the bureau commander for further review.

C.

A comprehensive review of the pursuit will be completed by the division
staff and recommendations will be directed to the officer(s) involved, the
supervisors, and if pertinent, to all sworn department personnel.

D.

Pursuit reviews will consistently be monitored and the information
gathered will be incorporated into training bulletins and training courses.

TRAINING REQUIREMENT
A.

Officers shall not engage in a pursuit until they have successfully
completed a department sponsored Emergency Vehicle Operations
course. Officers shall also be required to attend an annual course that
specifically covers the department's pursuit policy.

B.

All department law enforcement personnel shall retain a current copy of
the pursuit policy and shall refer to it as a basis for initiation,
continuation, and termination of a pursuit.

ADDENDUM B
Decision and Order of Remand

BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

TROOPER ROSS G. PACE,
Appellant,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY,
Respondent

:
:

DECISION AND
ORDER OF REMAND

:
:
:
:

Case Nos* 18 CSRB/H.0.262 (Step 5)
7 CSRB 64 (Step 6)

On April 4,2002, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) completed its appellate
review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties and an executive session. The
following Board Members were present and heard oral argument at the hearing and deliberated in an
executive session: Blake S. Atkin, Chairman, Felix J. McGowan, Joan M. Gallegos, and Dale L. Whittle.
At the hearing, Trooper Ross Pace (Appellant) was present and presented oral argument on his own behalf.
Accompanying Trooper Pace was his wife, Ramona Pace. Assistant Attorney General Laurie L. Nada
represented the Department of Public Safety (Department and DPS) with Lin Miller, Human Resource
Director, present as the Department's Management Representative.
AUTHORITY
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code at §§67-19a-101 through -408
(Supp. 1998) ofthe State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures, which is a sub-part of the Utah
State Personnel Management Act at §§67-19 etseq. The CSRB's administrative rules are published in
the Utah Administrative Code at Rl 37-1 -1 through -23 {Supp. 1998). This Board-level or step 6 appeal
hearing is thefinaladministrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for
Trooper Pace's appealfromhis 20-day suspension. Both the Board's evidentiary/step 5 and these
appellate/step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to Rl 37-1 -18(2)(a).
Therefore, those provisions ofthe Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAP A) pertaining to formal
adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's step 5 and step 6 hearings. (§§63-46b etseq.)

0235

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Onorabout August 30,1999, Appellant was given a'"Notice oflntent to Impose Discipline" that
was signed by Lt. Bardell Hamilton, Commander ofField Section Seven, Utah Highway Patrol (UHP),
where Appellant was employed This '"Notice oflntent to Impose Discipline" was superceded by a second
"Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline" which was dated November 29, 1999, and signed by
Richard A. Greenwood, Deputy Commissioner, Utah Department of Public Safety. This second notice
of intent to discipline recommended that Appellant's employment with the Utah Highway Patrol be
terminated.l At the time these notices of intent were issued, Appellant had been employed as a Trooper
with the Utah Highway Patrol for more than 21 years.
The November Notice oflntent to Impose Discipline recommended that Appellant be terminated
based upon seven separate, unrelated charges all occurring in 1999. (Agency Ex. 4)
Thefirstofthese charges alleged that on March 14,1999, Appellantwas involved inahigh speed
chase that did not comply with DPS Policy 1-21V. relating to vehicle pursuits. In connection with this
allegation, the Department alleged that Appellant further violated UHP Policy 33-08 by not completing an
incidentreport prior to the end ofhis shiftthat day nor providing acopyofthe video tape oftheallegedhigh
speed pursuit. (R. at Id)
The second charge alleged that on October 29, 1999, Appellant falsified his daily log by
documenting that he was "in service" patrolling while actually eating 1 unch at Pasilla' s Cafe. The third
charge alleged that Appellant falsified his weekly report for the week October 16 through October 22,
1999. The fourth charge alleged that on May 25,1999, Appellant failed to attend a mandatory section
meetinginviolationofXJHPRulesandRegulations3-l-6. Thefifthcharge alleged that on May 30,1999,
Appellantwas in violation ofUHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-10 andDPS Policy and Procedures VI-1,
6-10, by leaving his assigned duty area and working in his farmfield.The sixth charge alleged that on
August 19,1999, he was again working in a farmfieldin direct violation ofUHP Rules and Regulations
3-1 -10 and adirect order allegedly given to Appellant by Lt. Hamilton on August 12,1999, directing him
to not work in his farmfieldwhile on duty. The seventh andfinalcharge involved allegations concerning
a late incident report dated November 4, 1999.

The Notice oflntent to Impose Discipline dated August 30,1999, recommended that Appellant be
suspended without pay for 30 working days.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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After receiving the November 29,1999 Notice of Intent to Discipline, Appellant requested a
hearing with the Utah Department of Public Safety's Administrative Law Judge J. Francis Valerga. This
hearing took place on April 3 and April 5,2000. In a written opinion issued in April 2000, Judge Valerga
partially sustained the Department5 s first charge. Specifically, Judge Valerga ruled that Appellant had
engaged in a high speed chase and violated DPS Policy and Procedure 1-21 by failing to notify dispatch
of the pursuit However, the other two allegations specifically related to the high speed chase were
dismissed Specifically the allegations relating to Appellant's failure to provide an incident report involving
the alleged high speed chase or a video tape were not sustained and dismissed. (Agency Ex. 2)
Judge Valerga sustained the second charge against Appellant - that he failed to properly notify
dispatch that he was taking a lunch break at Pasilla' s Cafe on October 29,1999. He also sustained the
third charge against Appellant relating to Appellant's failure to attend a mandatory section meeting on
May 25,1999, in violation of UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1 -6. Judge Valergafiirthersustained the fourth
andfifthcharges set forth in the November 29,1999 Notice of Intent to Discipline alleging that Appellant
violated UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-10 and a direct order by working in his farmfieldon May 30,
1999, and being in a farmfieldnext to a tractor on August 19,1999. However, Judge Valerga did not
sustain and overturned the third and seventh charges set forth in the November 29,1999 Notice ofIntent
to Discipline letter that involved the falsifying ofAppellant's weekly report andfilinga late incident report.
Based upon hisfindings,Judge Valerga recommended to Craig L. Dearden, then Commissioner
of Public Safety, that Appellant's employment with the Department not be terminated and that he be
reinstated to full employment with a 30-day suspension. (R. at Id)
Pursuant to Department policy, Appellant appealed the ALJ's Findings of Fact and
recommendation ofa 30-day suspension to Commissioner Craig Dearden. After reviewing and carefully
considering the facts and information concerning this matter, Commissioner Craig Dearden entered a Final
Order that Appellant be suspended for 20 days and undergo afitnessfor duty psychological examination
as well as a transfer to a new section. (Agency Ex. 1)
On about June 5,2000, Appellant timelyfiledhis appeal ofCommissioner Dearden's decision with
the CSRB.

Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. STEP 5 EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND RULING

On November 29 and 30,2000, a step 5 evidentiary hearing was held before CSRB Hearing
Officer {Catherine A. Fox (Hearing Officer). At the hearing, Appellant represented himself/?ro se and was
assisted by his wife, Ramona Pace. The Department was represented by Assistant Attorney General
Laurie L. Noda, who was assisted by the Department's management representative, LL Bardell Hamilton
(Hamilton), Commander of UHP Section Seven.
The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold an evidentiary hearing can be found at Utah Code
Annotated, §67-19a-406. Moreover, because Appellant was challenging a suspension, the Department
had the burden ofproving their case by substantial evidence. (Utah Code Annotated, §67-19a-406(2)(a)
and (c)) The specific issues adjudicated at Appellant's step 5 hearing were twofold. First, did the
Department suspend Appellant for 20 days to either (a) advance the good ofthe public service, or (b) for
just cause?
At the hearing, the Hearing Officer received evidence concerning thefiveremaining charges against
Appellant. Specifically, there was testimony given and received concerning the Pasilla's Cafe incident
occurring on October 29,1999; Appellant's failure to attend a mandatory section meeting on May 25,
1999; the two farmfieldincidents occurring on May 30, and August 19,1999 respectively; and finally,
there was testimony given and received concerning the alleged high speed pursuit incident which occurred
on March 14,1999.
At the conclusion ofthe hearing, the Hearing Officer entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decision dated December 20,2000. In this decision, the Hearing Officer specifically reviewed
thefiveremaining charges against Appellant and concluded that there was substantial evidence to support
the conclusion that "the Department's imposed discipline is [was] appropriate in this case." (Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision at p.5, Conclusion 11.)
B. ISSUES ON APPEAL

In Appellant's appeal before the CSRB, he challenges numerous aspects ofthe Hearing Officer's
step 5 decision. Specifically, Appellant argues that many ofthe charges against him were not supported
by substantial evidence at the hearing. This is particularly true with respect to the two farmfieldincidents.
In Appellant's Brief, he specifically states with respect to the May 3 0 farmfieldincident that"... I do not
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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believe that the Department met its burden of proof. There is simply too much coincidence surrounding
this incident for the evidence to be considered substantial." (Appellant's Briefat p.2)2 With respect to the
August 19 farm tractor incident, Appellant states that "the charges related to this incident cannot be
supported by substantial evidence because it does not exist... There is no quantum or quality of relevant
evidence to support that a direct order was given" (R. at Id at pp. 1-2)
In addition, Appellant asserts that the Hearing Officer erred by sustaining the severity of discipline
imposed on him by the Department. Onpage 1 of Appellant's Brief, he specifically states in the opening
paragraph that "a 20-day suspension is too severe based on the following: (1) inequity of discipline." On
page 9 of Appellant's Brief, he states that "Grievant again submits that a 20-day suspension is too harsh
for the infractions that were committed."
Indeed, with respect to some of the specific charges against him, Appellant cites to the hearing
transcript to show that other troopers received little or no discipline for engaging in conduct similar to that
for which Appellant was disciplined. Appellant cites testimonyfromvarious witnesses including Trooper
Richard Henning, Trooper Nolan Brown, Sgt Douglas Devenish, and Lt Bardell Hamilton, all of whom
testified ofdoing personal business while on duty, ostensively without receiving any disciplinefromthe
Department (R. at Id. p.4) Specifically addressing the August 19 farm fieldincident in Appellant's Brief,
he concludes his argument by stating: "There is great inconsistency in the discipline here. Trooper Pace is
the only person disciplined for doing personal business while on duty. Three minutes in afieldcompared
to buying horses, selling horses, and traveling outside the assigned patrol area would indicate that he
[Trooper Pace] was singled out for discipline." (R. at Id)3
Finally, with respect to the missed mandatory meeting and the Pasilla' s Cafe incident, Appellant
writes in his Brief"... the amount of discipline given to Paul Brown for the identical infractions was a oneday suspension. It would be inappropriate to impose more than one day for these incidents." Appellant

It should be noted that Appellant's Step 6 Brief does not have numbered pages. Therefore, when the
Board refers to a page in Appellant's Brief, it is referring to the numbered page which the Board has attached to his
Brief beginning with the first page as number 1 and continuing through to the signature page, which is numbered
page 9.
Various troopers including Henning, Brown, Sgt. Douglas and Lt. Hamilton all testified of doing personal
business while on duty. Some of that testimony included the buying and selling of horses while on duty and
traveling outside assigned areas to check on personal property.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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then cites to page 269 lines 20-25 of the hearing transcript, to show that "the charge of missing a
mandatory section meeting was dropped in Paul Brown's case." (R. at Id p.8)
In essence, Appellant challenges the Hearing Officer'sfinaldecision on two primary grounds. First,
Appellant asserts that there was not substantial evidence to support the specific charges against Appellant
and the Hearing Officer erred by concluding that substantial evidence supported the Department's charges.
Second, Appellant asserts that even ifthere was substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's
decision, the imposition of a 20-day suspension was disproportionate inrelationto the charges against him.
These issues will be addressed in the remainder ofthis Decision and Find Agency Action as they relate to
each specific charge against Appellant
C. THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Administrative Code Rl 37- l-22(4)(a) through (c),
(Supp. 2000\ which reads as follows:
L The board shallfirstmake a determination of whether the factual findings of the
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial
evidence standard. When the board determines that the factual findings of the
CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct
the factualfindings,and/or make new or additional factual findings.
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the CSRB
hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the factual findings
based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then determine
whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules,
and statutes in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being
granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer.
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing
officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable
and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of
relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined according to the above provisions.

Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's factual
findings are reasonable and rationally based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and whether those
findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact finder1 s decision to
determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant pDlicies, rules, and statutes according
to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer on this legal issue. Finally, the
Board5 s appellate role is to consider whether the totality ofthe Department's disciplinary penalty ofa 20day suspension is reasonable and rational based upon our determination ofthe ultimate facts together with
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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the correct application of relevant State policies, rules and statutes which were considered by our Hearing
Officer.
BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
OF THE SPECIFIC CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT4
1. HIGH SPEED PURSUIT INCIDENT

After reviewing the evidentiary record, it appears to the Board there is very little factual dispute
between the Department and Appellant concerning the critical facts related to the high speed pursuit
incident.5 Substantial evidence produced by both parties establishes the following facts.
On March 14,1999, at approximately 6:25 p.m., Appellant was traveling eastbound on SR 80.
At that time, he observed a vehicle traveling westbound on SR 80 at a very high rate of speed. When the
car came within radar range, Appellant initiated his radar and received a reading of 92 miles per hour.
Appellant testified that he looked over at the subject when he went by and that the subject looked at
Appellant. Appellant activated his lights and continued eastbound until he found a place to turn in the
divider.6 Appellant then testified that once he had turned through the divider, he picked up speed and
began chasing the vehicle for speeding. (T.II, 328; Agency Ex. 15, Incident Report; Agency Ex. 16, Pursuit
Review Board Findings, p.l,fET)
This chase began at mile marker 157 and ended at a westbound rest area at about mile marker 147
where Appellant there arrested the individual for evading and DUI. (T.II, 331; Agency Ex. 15) Atthe
evidentiary hearing, Appellant testified that during this chase, there were long periods of time where he lost
complete visual contact with the car he was chasing because of the curvy, mountain road in this area. (T.II,
328-329) Appellant also testified that throughout most of this incidentthe vehicle he was chasing was
approximately three quarters to one mile ahead ofhim until the suspect pulled into the westbound rest area
at about mile marker 147. (T.II, 331-333; Agency Ex. 16, fll. 1) Because of these facts, Appellant

"The Board will address each individual charge against Appellant in the order that Ms. Fox addressed them
in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision dated December 20,2000.
In order to enhance clarity, the Board has determined to not only follow the order in which the Hearing
Officer addressed these charges, but to also use the same title or label the Hearing Officer used. As an example, in
her Findings of Fact and Decision, the Hearing Officer addresses the first charge before her as the "high speed
pursuit incident." The Board will follow this pattern.
Agency Ex. 16, which is the Pursuit Review Board Finding, refers to the "divider" as a " median."
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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testified that during most ofthis chase he was not certain whether the susf>ect knew he was being pursued
by Appellant and thus trying to avoid apprehension, or ifthe suspect was simply continuing to travel at a
very high rate of speed, unaware of Appellant's pursuit (R at Id p.333-334)
Appellant further testified that it was not until the chase'sfinalhalf mile, or "the last minute," that
he realized the driver was actively trying to avoid apprehension. At that point, however, just when
Appellant believed the chase was turning into a" 10-80" pursuit according to DPS Policy 1-21, the suspect
pulled into a rest area and stopped. (JLatld) After the suspect pulled into the rest area, Appellant was
able to pull in behind the vehicle and make the arrest. (R. Id)
As a result ofthis incident, Appellant was charged with violating DPS Policy 1-21, Vehicle Pursuits.
This policy provides in pertinent part as follows:
V. PROCEDURES
1. Any law enforcement officer in a department vehicle with operable
emergency vehicle equipment and radio may initiate a vehicular pursuit
when the following criteria are met:
a.
The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid
apprehension through evasive or unlawful tactics.
b.
The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at
the direction of the officer.
c.
The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue
would further enhance the danger presented to the
public.
***
B.
Pursuit Officer Responsibilities:
1.
The pursuing officer shall activate headlights and all
emergency equipment upon initiating pursuit
2.
The pursuing officer shall immediately notify communications
center personnel that a pursuit is underway. Use of plain English
transmissions is encouraged, rather than using the ten-code.
The officer shall provide communications center personnel with
the following information:
a.
Unit identification;
b.
Location, speed, and direction of travel of the fleeing
vehicle;
c.
Description and license plate number, if known of the
pursued vehicle;
d.
Number of occupants in the fleeing vehicle, including
descriptions, where possible; and
e.
Reason for initiating the pursuit

(emphasis added)
At the conclusion ofthe testimony given with respect to this charge, the Hearing Officer concluded that
there was substantial factual evidence to support the Department's charges that Appellant's conduct
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violated DPS policy relating to vehicle pursuits and that discipline was properly imposed. (Findings ofFact,
Conclusions of Law and Decision at p.7)
After thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, including the Department's policy
with respect to vehicle pursuits, the Board does not sustain, and thus overturns the Hearing Officer's
Decision with respect to this charge. In reaching this conclusion, the Board focuses primarily on whether
the relevant policies, rules and statutes set forth in the record were correctly applied to the facts supporting
this charge. (Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(b))
With respect to the initiation ofvehicle pursuits, DPS Policy 1-21V., grants the officer involved
complete discretion and latitude in determining whether to initiate a "vehicular pursuit." The policy
provides, in pertinent part, that an enforcement officer with appropriate equipment may initiate a vehicular
pursuit when the following criteria are met:
(a)
(b)
(c)

the suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension through evasive or unlawful tactics;
the suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the direction of the officer; and
when the suspects actions are such that failure to pursue would further enhance the danger
presented to the public. (Agency Ex. 5)

At the evidentiary hearing on this charge, numerous witnesses including Col. Greenwood, testified
that it is up to the officer involved in the incident to determine whether the required elements are present
to initiate a pursuit. Indeed, when asked "Who must initiate a pursuit?" Col. Greenwood responded "The
pursuing officer." (T.I, 48) When questioned further, Col. Greenwood responded as follows:
Q: The pursuing officer must initiate it under what criteria?
A : . . .when the officer feels that the violator is not responding to the emergency
equipment or the direction of the officer to pull the car over. (R. Id)

Consistent with Col. Greenwood's testimony, Troopers Steven Bytheway, Nolan Brown and Richard
Henning all testified that it is the officer involved in the chase that makes the discretionary decision of
whether to initiate a "pursuit." (T.II, 262-263; 282; 303)
It is clearfromreading DPS Policy 1-21 relating to vehicle pursuits that it is only after the officer
involved in a chase makes a determination to initiate a "high speed pursuit" that he must inform the
communication center ofthe following: (a) their unit identification; (b) location, speed, and direction oftravel
ofthefleeingvehicle; (c) description and license number, ifknown, ofthe pursued vehicle; (d) number of
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occupants in thefleeingvehicle, including vehicle descriptions, where possible; and (e) reason for initiating
the pursuit,7
The evidence supports Appellant5 s position that he did not believe he was involved in a "high speed
pursuit" and thus, could not be in violation of DPS Policy 1-21. Appellant testified that throughout most
ofthis incident, the vehicle he was chasing was approximately three quarters to one mile ahead ofhim. He
also testified that throughout most ofthis incident, he lost visual contact with the car he was chasing. It was
not until "the last minute" that Appellant realized the driver he was chasing was actively trying to avoid
apprehension. However, at about the time Appellant believed the suspect he was chasing was in fact
attempting to avoid apprehension, the suspect pulled into a rest area and came to a complete stop.
As stated previously, the Department's own policy clearly establishes that until such time as the
trooper believes he is in a high speed pursuit, he is not obligated to inform dispatch or "a communications
center" of any of the items set forth in DPS Policy 1-21V. B. 2. a.-e. Applying the facts of this case to the
policy at issue, the Board does not sustain the Department's charge relating to the high speed pursuit
incident and thus, overturns the Hearing Officer's decision.
Finally, in her written decision, the Hearing Officer set forth fo ur reasons why she felt there was
substantial evidence to support that a high speed pursuit took place and that discipline was properly
imposed. (Findings of Fact, and Decision at pp. 7-9) First, the Hearing Officer asserts that Judge Valerga
"concluded that a high speed pursuit had occurred."8 Second, the Hearing Officer asserts that the majority
ofthe witnesses testified that, as written in the incident report, it appeared that Grievant [Appellant] was
involved in a high speed pursuit. Third, the Hearing Officer notes that in Appellant's incident report
associated with this chase, he wrote in the heading "Incident Involves" the word "pursuit" (Agency Ex. 15)
Finally, the Hearing Officer relied upon the Department's Pursuit Review Board Finding indicating that
Appellant violated all the criteria ofa pursuing officer's responsibility outlined in DPS Policy and Procedure
1-21 V.B.I, and 2. a.-e.

There is substantial evidence in the record to support the Department's position that Appellant did not
inform his communication center or dispatch of his unit number, his location, speed and direction of travel, a
description of the vehicle or a license plate number, number of occupants in the vehicle or a reason for initiating a
pursuit However, Appellant argues that these are not relevant in the instant charge because he did not feel he had
ever initiated a" high speed pursuit" under DPS Policy 1-21.
8

Judge Valerga was the hearing officer for the Department who heard the step 4 or department level hearing

in this case.
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The Board is not persuaded that any ofthese reasons provide substantial evidence to support the
charge in this incident First ofall, the CSRB Hearing Officer is under no obligation to give any weight or
credibility to the department hearing's findings of fact. The CSRB hearing is de novo with the obligation
on the hearing officer to determine whether facts presented at the CSRB evidentiary hearing support by
substantial evidence the allegations ofthe department Factual determinations and conclusions of the
department need not, and indeed should not, be given conclusionary weight at the CSRB hearing. This is
particularly true in the instant case where Appellant specifically asserted that the Department'sfindingsof
fact were erroneous. (T.H, 374-375)
With respect to the evidence presented at the CSRB evidentiary hearing, the evidence supports
Appellant's position that he did not believe he was involved in a high speed pursuit because he was unsure
until the very last moment whether the subject he was following was attempting to avoid apprehension or
that he was refusing to stop for Appellant. The evidence also supports Appellant's position that almost
simultaneous to his belief that the subject was avoiding apprehension or refusing to stop, the individual
pulled into a rest area and came to a stop. Again, it is not until Appellant, or any officer involved in a chase,
makes the subjective determination that an individual was attempting to avoid apprehension or refusing to
stop that they may initiate a pursuit. (Agency Ex. 5) (emphasis added) The evidence was that Appellant
never made that subjective determination. Without that subjective determination being made, substantial
evidence does not support a finding that a high speed pursuit occurred.
Second, it is largely non-dispositive that after reviewing the incident report, a "majority ofthe
witnesses" believed Appellant was involved in a high speed pursuit. Reliance on this testimony fails to
address the discretionary element of Department policy that allows the trooper involved in the incident to
make the determination of whether to initiate a pursuit This discretion mustfirstbe exercised before any
of the other provisions of the pursuit policy come into play.9
Third, with respect to Appellant labeling his incident report as a pursuit, the Board does not believe
this statement is substantially indicative ofhis state ofmind at the time ofthe events that are the basis ofthis
charge. This is particularly true in light of the fact that there is substantial, credible evidencefromthe

As stated previously, untH the officer believes he is involved in a pursuit based upon set criteria in policy,
he is under no obligation to inform dispatch ofhis unit identification, location and direction, a description and
license plate of the vehicle, or the reason for initiating the pursuit (T.n, 283; T.I, 49)
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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evidentiary record to indicate that throughout the majority ofthe incident giving rise to this charge Appellant
was unsure ifthe subject he was chasing was avoiding apprehension or otlierwise refusing to stop. In Ught
of all the facts associated with this incident and the record as a whole, the Board does not feel that
Appellant designating this incident as a pursuit on the incident report rises to the level of substantial
evidence.
Finally, the Board is not persuaded by the findings of the Department' s Pursuit Review Board.
First, it should be pointed out that thefindingsofthe Board indicate that "DPS Pursuit Policy (1-21) were
not followed." (Agency Ex. 16 p. 1) In their analysis identifying what pant ofpolicy Trooper Pace did not
follow, the Pursuit Board states:
ffl.

ANALYSIS
By not advising Dispatch of any information, the pursuing trooper
showed blatant disregard for his own safety, as well as the safety of
officers he was calling to assist him.
The boardfPursuit Board] feels that Trooper Pace violated all
criteria of pursuing officer's responsibilities, as outlined in Policy 1-21
(V),(B),(l),(2)<*,b,c,d,e.

(Id at p.3 f 111) (emphasis added)
It is important to note that the Pursuit Board'sfindingsare that Appellant violated the provisions
of the pursuit policy that are required only after the pursuing officer determines that he is involved in a
pursuit, i.e., unit identification, location, description, and reason for initiating pursuit. The Pursuit Board
concluded that by not giving dispatch this information, he was placing himself and otliers in harm's way.
As stated previously, these required procedures come into effect only after a trooper makes a
subjective decision that he or she is involved in a pursuit. Until such time as the trooper makes that
determination, none of these policies or procedures outlined by the Pursuit Board come into play. The
Pursuit Boardfindingsand analysis are therefore not persuasive in determining whether Appellant violated
the Department's pursuit policy with respect to this incident
Because the Board does not believe that the Department policies, rules or procedures were
correcdy applied to the facts associated with this charge, the Hearing Officer's decision concerning the high
speed pursuit incident cannot be sustained and is therefore overturned. This decision is rendered pursuant
to Utah Administrative Code, Rrl37-l-22(4)(d) which allows the Board to determine whether the CSRB
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hearing officer correctly applied the relevant policies or rules. This review is done on a correctness
standard with no deference given to the Hearing Officer's prior decision.
2. PASILLA'S CAFE INCIDENT

In the Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline dated November 29,1999, the Department charged
thaton October 29,1999, Appellant falsified his daily logby stating that he was patrolling SR 32, SR248,
and Brown's Canyon, when in fact, the Department alleged, he was having lunch at Pasilla's Cafe in
Kamas, Utah. The Department alleged that this conduct by Appellant violated the Law Enforcement Code
of Ethics and also constituted insubordination for failing to follow a direct order given to him by his
supervisors. (Agency Ex. 4) After reviewing the evidentiary step 5 hearing record, including the sworn
testimony ofwitnesses and the documents admitted into evidence, the Board concludes there is substantial
evidence to support this charge.
The evidentiary record establishes that several months prior to this incident, Lt. Hamilton issued
a memorandum to all section seven personnel informing them, among other things, that officers were
required to check out when going on breaks. (Agency Ex. 9) Sgt Jeff Petersen, who at the time was
acting as Appellant's direct supervisor, testified that shortly after Lt. Hamilton issued his written
memorandum, he sat down with each officer in Section Seven and reiterated the requirement that all officers
were required to check out when going on break. (T.I, 152-153) Nowhere in the evidentiary record does
Appellant deny that he received the July 15,1999 memorandumfromLt. Hamilton or that he discussed
this memo with Sgt. Petersen.
Moreover, in his appeal to the Board, Appellant appears to not even challenge the Hearing
Officer's decision as it relates to the Pasilla' s Cafe incident. In his nearly nine page briefto the Board,
Appellant uses only one sentence addressing this charge. This sentence can be found at page 8 of
Appellant' s Brief, where Appellant simply states "Trooper Pace missed a mandatory meeting and was at
Pasilla's Cafe."
Based upon these facts, the Boardfindsthat the step 5 Hearing Officer's decision and factual
findings with respect to the Pasilla' s Cafe incident are reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary
record as a whole and are supported by substantial evidence. It also is clear that the Hearing Officer
correctly applied "the relevant policies, rules and statutes" as required by Utah Administrative Code,
R137-l-22(4)(b).
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First, the facts establish that Appellant was aware ofthe order given by Lt Hamilton to all Section
Seven personnel requiring that officers check out for their breaks.l0 Sgt Petersen also testified that he
discussed this requirement with Appellant within a few days after the memo was written. (T.I, 153)
Moreover the evidentiary record clearly establishes that Appellant was at Pasilla's Cafe eating lunch and
that he did not checkout. (T.I, 356-358) Furthermore, in his incident report dated November 4,1999,
concerning the Pasillas' Cafe incident, Appellant admits that he forgot to check out while eating lunch at
Pasilla's and states that "I will not forget to check out again." (Agency Ex. 7) Finally, the evidentiary
record estabUshes that the officer with whom Appellant had lunch at Pasilla's Cafe was also disciplined for
this incident.11
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision with respect to
the Pasilla's Cafe incident. Based upon the record as a whole, it is clear that the Hearing Officer's factual
findings and analysis with respect to the Pasilla's Cafe incident are reasonable and rational and supported
by substantial evidence as required pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, Rl 37-1-22(4).
Thefinalmatter to be addressed with respect to the Pasilla's Cafe incident, is whether the discipline
imposed on Appellant is reasonable and rational in light ofthis ruling. (Utah Administrative Code, Rl 371 -22(4)(c)) Because the Board's decision significantly modifies or amends thefindingsofthe Hearing
Officer, the Board is ordering that this charge be remanded to the Hearing Officer to determine a
proportionate discipline in light of this ruling.
3. FAILURE TO ATTEND MANDATORY SECTION MEETING INCIDENT

Like the previous charge, there is iitde factual dispute concerning Appellant's failure to attend a
section meeting on May 25,1999. Both at the evidentiary hearing and in. his Brief, Appellant admits to not
attending this meeting.12

l0

This order was given pursuant to the memorandumfromLt Bardell Hamilton to all Section Seven
personnel. It was dated July 15,1999, and placed in each trooper's box within that section. The memo was also
placed on a "greaseboard"in the Section Seven office. (T.I, 88-89)
1

* It is clearfromthe evidentiary record that this trooper received a one-day suspension. However, it
appears that this one-day suspension was given in connection with the Pasilla's Cafe incident and also for the
"inappropriate comments made to another agency on the radio." (T.II, 271,379)
12

At the hearing, Appellant testified "I did miss this section meeting. It was on my day off... I got busy
and couldn't make it in to attend this mandatory section meeting. (T.II, 359) In his Brief, Appellant simply states
"Trooper Pace missed the mandatory meeting..." (Appellant Brief at page 8)
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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The primary issue in dispute with respect to this charge appears to be whether this meeting was in
fact mandatory and whether the discipline Appellant received with respect to his failure to attend this
meeting was overly severe.
With respect to whether or not this section meeting was mandatory, it is clearfromthe evidentiary
record as a whole that attendance at section meetings is not required by Department policy. (Agency Brief
at p.5; Appellant's Brief at p.8) However, Appellant was charged with violating a direct order to attend
this meeting, not with violating any specific policy mandating attendance at section meetings. In light ofthis
fact, there is substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's determination that Appellant failed to
attend this meeting in violation of a direct order given to him by Lt. Hamilton.
Lt. Hamilton testified that prior to the May 25 section meeting, he informed Appellant that
attendance at the meeting was mandatory. (T.I, 75) In direct contradiction to this, Appellant testified that
"... there was never a time that me [Trooper Pace] and Lt. Hamilton ever discussed this meeting, whether
to go or whether to not go." (T.II, 360, 378)
As stated previously, the Board's obligation on review is to first make a determination on whether
the factualfindingsofthe Hearing Officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial evidence
standard (R137-l-22(4)(a)). In the instant case, the Hearing Officer received testimonyfromboth
Appellant and Lt. Hamilton concerning whether Appellant had received a direct orderfromLt. Hamilton
to attend this meeting. As the Hearing Officer, she was in the unique position to hear this testimony, weigh
the evidence given, and to deliberate on the testimony of the witnesses.
At the conclusion of all the testimony given with respect to this charge, and specifically as to
whether this meeting was mandatory, the Hearing Officer ruled that there was substantial evidence to
sustain the charge that attendance at the May 25,1999 section meeting was mandatory and that Appellant
failed to attend this meeting.
Applying the Board's previously cited standard of review, we hold that the Hearing Officer's
findings are reasonable and rational according to the substantial evidence standard.I3 Moreover, this Board

Citing Chrysler Corporation v. US Environmental Protection Agency, C.A., 631F2nd 865, 890. Blacks
Law Dictionary provides the following concerning substantial evidence: "Under the substantial evidence rule, as
applied in administrative proceedings, all evidence is comparable and may be considered, regardless of its source
and nature, if it is the kind of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. In other words,
the competency of evidence for purposes of administrative agency adjudicatory proceedings is made to rest upon
the logical persuasiveness of such evidence to the reasonable mind in using it to support a conclusion. It is more
than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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has consistently held that thefindingsby a factfinderare entitled to a presumption ofcorrectness. Jones
v. Utah Department ofPublic Safety, 4 CSRB 3 8 (Step 6 1992) See, generally Parks and Recreation
v. Anderson, 3 PRB 22 at p. 7-8 (1986); Utah Department of Transportation vs. Rasmnssen, 2
PRB 19atp.l0-l 1(1986). Though in his appeal Appellant disputed whether this meeting was in fact
mandatory, he has failed to marshall sufficient credible evidence to overcome the Hearing Officer's decision
that attendance at the May 25, 1999 section meeting was mandatory and that he failed to attend.
Thefinalissued that must be addressed with respect to this charged whether the disciphne imposed
upon the Appellant is rational in light ofthis ruling. As stated previously, because this Board's decision with
respect to this case significantly modifies and amends the findings ofthe Hearing Officer, the Board is
ordering that this charge be remanded to the Hearing Officer to determine proportionate discipline in light
of this ruling.
In connection with this remand, the Board cites to the evidentiary record which establishes that in
approximately twenty-two years of service with the Department, Appellant never missed one of these
section meetings. (T.II, 361) In addition, the evidentiary record also establishes that Trooper Brown also
missed the same section meeting, but was not disciplined for doing so. (T.II, 269, 271)
4.

MAY

30,1999 FARM FIELD INCIDENT

Consistent with Utah Administrative Code Rl 37-1 -22(4), ourfirstobligation with respect to this
incident is to determine whether the findings ofthe Hearing Officer are reasonable and rational according
to the substantial evidence standard. Next, we must determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly
applied the relevant policies, rules and statues in reaching her decision. The Board may not give deference
to the Hearing Officer's decision on this issue.
With respect to the factual findings ofthe Hearing Officer regarding this incident, it is clear the
Hearing Officer considered and weighed the testimony and documentary evidence before her. At the
conclusion of all the testimony given, she ruled that there was substantial evidence to sustain this charge.
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, this Boardfindsthat the Hearing
Officer's factualfindingswith respect to this incident are reasonable and rational and can be supported by
substantial evidence.

conclusion."
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At the evidentiary hearing, Troopers Chris Simmons and Mike Loveland both testified concerning
the May 30 incident Trooper Simmons testified that on the afternoon of May 30,1999, between the hours
of 2:00 and 4:00 p.m.l4 that Trooper Mike Lo veland and he were traveling on their motorcycles just prior
to the Coalville area. (T.I, 210) While traveling past Appellant's farmfield,Trooper Simmons saw an
individual-who he was unable to identify-standing in thefield.(FLat Id p.212) While passing this farm
field, Trooper Simmons testified that he was listening to the "Summit County repeater, and there were
several attempts to - or security checks on Badge 125." (R. at Id. p.210) Trooper Simmons further
testified that though he did not know Appellant, Trooper Loveland at that time identified the individual in
thefieldas Appellant. (R. at Id,; Agency Ex. 2.)
Trooper Michael Loveland testified similar to Trooper Simmons. He testified that he heard the
same security checks for Badge 125 (Appellant). He testified that he knew Appellant, where hisfieldsand
residence were located, and where Appellant kept his cattle. He further testified that as he passed
Appellant's farmfield,he saw Appellant "out in thefieldin coveralls." (T.I, 225) Finally, Trooper Loveland
testified that on the third or fourth security check for Appellant, he saw Appellant "reach down into his right
leg pocketofhis coveralls andpull out a hand-held radio."(R. at Id p.225-226) Simultaneous with seeing
Appellant pull out a radio, Trooper Loveland heard Badge 125 respond " 10-4 thanks" over the radio. (R.

dtld)
These facts, which were clearly relied upon by the Hearing Officer, are sufficient to support her
factualfindingthat Appellant was working in hisfieldaround 3:00 in the afternoon of May 30,1999. The
Boardfindsno reversible error with respect to the Hearing Officer's factualfindingsregarding this incident
and therefore, rules that they are supported by substantial evidence.
However, with respect to this charge, the Board doesfindreversible error in the Hearing Officer's
application ofthe Department's policies or rules to the facts surrounding this incident. Because the Board
finds that the applicable policies and rules were not correctly applied with respect to the May 30,1999
farmfieldincident, the Hearing Officer's decision with respect to this charge is not sustained.
In reaching this conclusion, the Board relies upon a number of factors. First in its November 29,
1999 Notice of Intent to Discipline, the Department alleges that by being in his field on May 30,1999,
Appellant violated UHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-10 and DPS Policy and Procedure VI-1,6-10.

On cross-examination, Trooper Simmons testified that it was " probably" at 2:49 in the afternoon. (T.I, 220)
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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Moreover, paragraphfiveofthis same notice ofintent specifically references an alleged verbal order given
by Lt Hamilton to Appellant on August 12,1999, mandating that under no circumstances was Appellant
to work in hisfieldwhile on duty. (Agency Ex. 4, p.3, %5)
UHP Regulation 3-1-10 provides in pertinent part that"... employees shall... remain on duty
during the hours indicated on the duty schedule." (Agency Ex. 12) DPS Policy and Procedure VI-1,6-10
states that "officers will devote their on duty time to the completion oftaste and responsibiUties associated
with their assignment." (Agency Ex. 13)
At the evidentiary hearing on this matter, Col. Richard Greenwood, then Deputy Commissioner
with the Department ofPublic Safety and Superintendent ofthe Highway Patrol, testified during crossexamination that if a trooper was on break, it would not be a violation of policy for that trooper to be
present in their farmfield.(T.I, 53) Specifically, on cross-examination, Col. Greenwood was asked: "If
I can show that I'm on break during the time they supposedly saw me in myfield,am I allowed to be out
in myfieldon a break? A: I—If you're on break, yeah." (R. at Id)
In the instant case, the evidence produced at trial establishes that at the time Appellant was alleged
to have been in his farmfieldon May 30,1999, he was on break. Grievant's Exhibit number 9 which is
Appellant's UHP Daily Report for May 30,1999, indicates that onthis date, Appellant took a break from
2:10until2:50 in the afternoon onMay 30,1999.15 Based upon this fact and Col. Greenwood's testimony,
it does not appear that Appellant violated UHP Rule 3 -1 -10 or DPS Po iicy and Procedure VI-1,6-10 by
beinginhisfarmfieldonMay30,1999. These policies require that employees devote their "on-duty" time
to completing their tasks and remain on duty during the hours indicated on their schedule. Because
substantial evidence supports Appellant's position that he was on break, during the time he was alleged to
have been in hisfieldon May 30, 1999, the Board finds no violation of the above-referenced policies.

During the evidentiary hearing, Counsel for the Department objected to the admission of this document
based upon authenticity and whether it was created contemporaneous with May 30, 1999. The Hearing Officer
admitted Grievant Ex. 9, but noted counsel's concern that there was no way to authenticate it. (T.n, 342,343)
Grievant Ex. 9 also included a radio dispatch log created by the Summit County Sheriffs Office indicating that at
exactly 2:49 p.m. on May 30, dispatch initiated a security check on Appellant wherein Appellant immediately
responds to dispatch by saying "10-4 thanks". (R. at Id) This radio log was created by the Summit County Sheriffs
Office and when read in conjunction with Trooper's Simmons' and Loveland's testimony it provides credible
evidentiary support for Appellant's handwritten daily log indicating he was on break at that time. This radio log also
provides evidentiary support to Trooper Loveland's and Trooper Simmon's testimony that they saw Trooper Pace in
his field "probably at 2:49 p.m." (R. at Id.) The Board feels that all these facts together provide more strong credible
evidence to support Appellant's contention that his daily logs accurately reflect that he was on break in his farm
fieldfrom2:10 until 2:50 on the afternoon of May 30, 1999.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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Furthermore, a review ofthe evidentiary record as a whole establishes that whether Appellant had
checked out with dispatch prior to going on the May 30, 1999 break at issue in this charge is not
determinative as to whether Appellant violated UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1 -10 or DPS Policy and
Procedure VI-1,6-10. As stated previously, these policies essentially require that officers devote their ontime duty to the completion oftheir tasks.16 Furthermore, the specific charge relating to the May 30,1999
farm incident does not allege that Appellant violated policy by not checking out with dispatch prior to going
on break. Based upon the totality ofthe evidence, this Board concludes that the reason Appellant was not
charged with failing to check out with dispatch prior to going on break on May 3 0,1999, is because at that
time there was either no such rule or policy in place, or ifthere was such a rule or policy, it was not being
enforced.
Indeed, the only documentary evidence offered by the Agency to establish that troopers were to
check out with dispatch prior to going on break was a memorandum dated July 15,1999. (Agency Ex. 9)
This memorandum states in pertinent part that "we need to call 10-60 on all our stops and also let them
[dispatch] know when we are 10-7 for breaks along with the location." (R. at Id)
It is important to note, however, that this memorandum was dated July 15,1999, and was issued
approximatelysixweeksaftertheMay30,1999 farmfieldincident. The Department did not introduce
any other documentary evidence, including any rules or policies, indicating that this was the Department's
policy prior to July 15, 1999.
Furthermore, when Lt. Hamilton was cross-examined at the evidentiary hearing concerning this
July 15, 1999 memorandum, he testified as follows:
Q: Prior to this July 15th letter that stated that we had to check out on all breaks
and to follow the policy set up by Jim Lewis, was we required to check out on all
breaks?
A: Yes.
Q: Or was we just required to monitor the radio through our hand-held radio?
A: You were required to check out Everybody, I know, didn't check out like
they should. They just checked - or monitored the radio.
Q: That was my next question. So at that particular time hardly anybody checked
out on any breaks, is that correct, we was just monitoring our hand-held radios?
A: That's correct

(T.I, 104) (emphasis added)

With respect to these two policies, the Board has already determined that substantial evidence supports
the fact that Appellant was on break during the time period relevant to this charge and therefore, could legitimately
be in his farm field.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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This evidence persuades the Board that prior to July 15,1999, the requirement that troopers check out
with dispatch prior to going on break was either not mandated by policy or if it was, that policy was not
being enforced.
Thefinalissue that must be addressed with respect to this charge is whether Appellant violated the
direct order given to him by Lt. Hamilton specifically requiring that under no circumstances was Appellant
to work in hisfieldwhile on duty. (Agency Ex. 4, p.3, f5) At the outset, it must be pointed out that the
undisputed evidence establishes that this verbal directive, if given at all, was not given until August 12,
1999. The factual allegations supporting this charge occurred on May 30,1999, nearly three months
before any alleged verbal directive was given to Appellant Based upon this fact, the Boardfindsthat—to
the extent this charge is based uponLt Hamilton's verbal directive to Appellant—it cannot be legally
supported.17
Because the relevant Department policy or procedures were not correctly applied to the facts of
this charge, the Hearing Officer's decision cannot be sustained and it is therefore overturned. This decision
is rendered pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(b).
5,

THE AUGUST

19,1999 FARM FIELD TRACTOR INCIDENT

After careful review of the evidentiary record relating to the August 19,1999 farmfieldtractor
incident, the Board is remanding this charge to the Hearing Officer to comport her decision on this charge
with the facts as corrected by this Order.i8 This remand is based upon the fact the Hearing Officer's
decision appears to be based upon a factualfindingthat is clearly not supported by the evidentiary record.
In the Hearing Officer's written Findings of Fact and Decision, she states:
[Appellant] did not deny that he had been given a verbal directive by Lt. Hamilton
on August 12, to stay out of his fields. His defense appears to be that there is no
written record of the meeting and Lt. Hamilton could not remember all the details
relating to this meeting when the order was issued, i.e., whether it was on break or
in the office. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision at p.8)

Later on that same page, the Hearing Officer again states:
Neither does he dispute that prior to the incident, he was given a verbal order by
Lt. Hamilton. (R.at/<£)

l7

Beyond the Board's determination that this charge cannot be supported by a verbal directive given nearly
three months after the alleged incident, the Board is very troubled that in the Department's attempt to support the
allegations surrounding the May 30,1999 incident, it would make reference in its Notice of Intent to a verbal order
given three months after the facts givingriseto this charge occurred.
l8

This remand is pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(7)«
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These factual statements by the Hearing Officer are not supported by the record transcript and do
not accuratelyreflectAppellant's testimony at the evidentiary hearing on this important issue. On page 351
of the hearing transcript, Appellant testified as follows:
MR. PACE: Nowhere on this log does it show that I met with Lieutenant Hamilton.
I don't ever remember a meeting with Lieutenant Hamilton as far as a verbal direct
order to not be in any field.
HEARING OFFICER: Is your testimony that nowhere on 8/12/99 do you remember
a meeting?
MR. PACE: That's correct, I don't remember any meeting and I don't remember
getting a verbal direct orderfrom—
HEARING OFFICER: On this day?
MR. PACE: — Hamilton. On any day.

(T.II,351)19
The Board further notes that a clarification ofthis factualfindingis essential because the gravamen
ofthe Department's charge with respect to this incident is that Appellant violated "a verbal order given
[Appellant] by your Lieutenant on August 12 . . . "20
Contrary to the Hearing Officer's factualfindingthat "Grievant [Appellant] did not deny that he had
been given a verbal directive by Lt. Hamilton, Appellant clearly did dispute this factual assertion at the
evidentiary hearing. Indeed, besides flatly denying that any such order was given to him, Appellant spent
considerable time at the hearing attempting to show that Lt. Hamilton and he were never together on
August 12, ostensively to prove that said 'Verbal" order was not given on this day. (T.II, 349-354)21
Based upon the foregoing, the Board is remanding this charge to the Hearing Officer with this corrected
finding of fact.
It is important to note that Appellant clearly disputes the Hearing Officer's finding with respect to this
issue on page 3 of his Appellant Brief.
20

In the Department's Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline dated November 29, 1999, at page 3,
paragraph 6, the Department charges as follows:
(6) Violation of VHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-10 Duty Schedule and Area. On August 19,
1999\ another complaint was received stating that at approximately 10:30 a,m. this date you
were observed by UHP Disparcher Jed Critenden in afield working on a tractor. Thefieldwas
by the Barney France residence on Chalk Creek Road However the radio logfor the date and
time show you were checked out at the North Summit High School. The fact that you were again
out, apparently working, was in direct violation of the verbal order given you by your
Lieutenant on August 12th. as referenced above, (emphasis added)
21

The Board again wants to emphasize the importance of this factual finding. Substantial evidence in the
evidentiary record shows that Appellant was in his farm field with his son at approximately 10:30 on the morning of
August 19, 1999. (T.I, 110-111; T.D* 363) Substantial evidencefromthe evidentiary record also establishes that
Appellant was checked out on break with dispatchfromapproximately 10:30 to 11:30 on this same morning. (Agency
Ex. 21; T.II, 363) Based upon these facts, the primary feet at issue with respect to this charge is whether Appellant
violated a verbal order given to him by Lt. Hamilton to stay out of his fields.
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision
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By this ruling, the Board is simply requiring the Hearing Officer to base her decision with
respect to this charge from this corrected fact. However, and as stated previously, the Hearing
Officer is in the best and most unique position to weigh the evidence and judge the veracity of the
witness's statements. With this correction, the Hearing Officer is still granted discretion to decide
if there is substantial evidence to support this charge. The Hearing Officer may or may not change
her ultimate decision that substantial evidence supports this charge. She is however, instructed to
weigh and consider this corrected fact in making her decision.
Finally, once the Hearing Officer makes her finding on this charge, she will need to address
the issue of whether the discipline imposed on Appellant is reasonable and rational in light of her
final decision and this Board's overall ruling in this case.
DECISION
The Board has addressed each of the issues raised by Appellant in his appeal. After
thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record, the Board overturns the Hearing Officer' s decision with
respect to the high speed pursuit incident and the May 30, 1999 farm field incident The Board
further remands the August 19,1999 farm field tractor incident to the Hearing Officer to make her
decision based upon corrected facts as set forth in this ruling. Finally, with respect to the Pasilla's
Cafe incident and the failure to attend the mandatory section meeting, the Board finds there is
substantial evidence to support the factual allegations relating to these charges, but remands to the
Hearing Officer for a determination of proportionality in light of the Board's ruling in this case.
DATED this 22nd day of May 2002.

DECISION UNANIMOUS
Blake S. Atkin, Chair
Joan M. Gallegos, Member
Felix J. McGowan, Member
Dale L. Whittle, Member

j

Blake S. Atkin
Chair, Career Service Review Board
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RECONSIDERATION
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action by
complying with Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-13, Utah Administrative
Procedures Act

JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to Utah
Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Codef §63-46b-14 and -16t Utah Administrative Procedures Act
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

u. "rWrtrJl- -ftflmirkK

FROM:

Captain T.kf. ( W

Il/l5(<tt

DATE:

SUBJECT: PURSUIT REVIEW BOARD FINDINGS
The Utah Highway Patrol - Pursuit Review Board has reviewed Pursuit
Review case number
-jrflSs

00-(4-

Involving

(Vert | "TVnflfcf >r

(name
rank)
name and
and rarikl

I

_. This pursuit occurred on

•

3/r4hl

(location of pursuit)

f pursuit)
(Jdate of purs

'

It is the Review Board's opinion that appropriate guidelines under DPS Pursuit
Policy (1-21) [ ] were [ Pfwere not followed.

The Board directs that the following action be taken:
[ ] None
[ ] Letter of Counsel
[ ] Letter of Reprimand
[t^fSuspension without pay for ^

^
days.

( ] Other (Specify)

%

O.Oft^

PURSUIT REVIEW
CASE #079902031

Date of Pursuit:
Bureau

March 14. 1999

Field Bureau V

Review Board Members:

Date Reviewed:

Section

7

November 10. 1999
District

A

Lieutenant Ken Peav
Sergeant Dan Cat!in
Trooper Dan Ferguson

I. SUMMARY
While patrolling 1-80, near Wanship, Utah, at approximately 1825 hours,
after clocking a vehicle on radar at 92 miles per hour, a chase ensued.

II. PROCEDURES
1. Initiation of the Pursuit:
On March 14. 1999. at approximately 1825 hours, Trooper Ross Pace
was traveling east on 1-80. at milepost 157. Trooper Pace observed
and clocked a westbound vehicle on radar at 92 miles per hour. and.
after turning through the median with lights activated, pursued the
vehicle. Trooper Pace reported that as the vehicle passed by him,
the subject looked Trooper Pace in the eye and then sped up.
Trooper Pace then chased the vehicle from milepost 157. westbound,
at speeds up to 100 miles per hour before getting the vehicle
stopped in the rest area near Kimballs Junction, approximately
milepost 147, a distance of 10 miles.
2. Pursuit Officers Responsibilities:
The pursuing officer has the responsibility, by policy, to notify
the Communications Center that a pursuit is underway, give
identification, number of pursuing unit, give locations, speeds, and
directions of the fleeing vehicle. The officer also has the
responsibility to give the description and license plate number, if
known, number of occupants, and the reason for the pursuit. None of
this required information was given by the pursuing unit.

Pursuit Review
Case #079902031
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Per policy, all emergency equipment is to be activated.
Pace's report does not include that the siren was used.
to the audio tape, Trooper Pace's siren is not heard.

Trooper
Listening

Trooper Pace notified Dispatch that he needed units out of the
Section office, but never did advise of why back-up was needed. Had
back-up units been readily available, they still would not have know
why, what, locations, or directions. Even when questioned by
Dispatch, Trooper Pace did not give any of this information.
3. Back-Up Unit Responsibilities:
None. No units had enough information to assist, even though one
unit, UHP581, was three miles ahead. Trooper Trevor Olson, #581,
was never told directions until the pursuit had passed him going the
other direction.
4. Supervisory Responsibilities:
Same as back-up, but enough information was given to warrant a
supervisor's involvement or response. It was unclear what was
happening and who was involved.
5. Dispatcher Responsibilities:
After the initial call for assistance in the Silver Creek Junction
area, Dispatch immediately asked what the officer needed, what the
officer had, and what unit was involved. When no other information
was received, she immediately dispatched UHP581 to the Silver Creek
Junction area, where she assumed the unit needed assistance.
Dispatch repeatedly asked the unit for unit identification,
locations, and type of incident.
Once Dispatch was informed of locations and suspect vehicle
stopping, she immediately dispatched back-up units to the scene.
The board feels that with the information she had to go on. this
dispatcher did an excellent job with this pursuit. She tried
several times* to obtain information, to no avail. She tried to send
back-up prior to knowing what was going on, and finally to the
termination point. The board commends this dispatcher.
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III.

ANALYSIS
By not advising Dispatch of any information, the pursuing trooper showed
blatant disregard for his own safety, as well as the safety of officers
he was calling to assist him.
The board feels that Trooper Pace violated all criteria of pursuing
officers responsibilities, as outlined in Policy 1-21 (V), (B), (1),
(2) a, b. c. d, e.

IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION
The board agrees that with the gross violation of policy on this
pursuit, and the total disregard for officers safety, days off without
pay is warranted.
SECTION LIEUTENANT RECOMMENDATIONS:
None

V. HEADQUARTERS REVIEW BOARD FINDINGS:
Concur

VI.

Don't Concur

DISTRIBUTION
Headquarters-Review Board - Original
Review Board Members - Copies
Captain Ike Orr - Copy
Lin Miller - Copy
Lieutenant Bardell Hamilton - Copy
Sergeant Jeff Peterson - Copy
Trooper Ross Pace - Copy
Dispatch - Copy
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

TROOPER ROSS G. PACE,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND DECISION

Grievant,

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY,
Case No. 18 CSRB/H.O. 262
Hearing Officer: Katherine A. Fox

Agency.

THE STEP 5 HEARING TO DETERMINE the above-entitled matter was held on
Wednesday, November 29, 2000, and Thursday, November 30, 2000, beginning at 9:00 a.m. in
Conference Room 1116 and Conference Room 4112 respectively at the State Office Building,
Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah, before Katherine A. Fox, Career Service Review Board (CSRB)
Hearing Officer. Trooper Ross G. Pace (Grievant), represented himself pro se and was assisted by
his wife, Ramona Pace. The Utah Department of Public Safety (Department) was represented by
Assistant Attorney General Laurie L. Noda, and assisted by the Department's management
representative, Lieutenant Bardell Hamilton (Lt. Hamilton), Commander of Utah Highway Patrol
(UHP) Section Seven. A certified court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceedings and
witnesses were placed under oath. Testimony and documentary evidence were received into the
record. The Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, Utah Code, Subsection 63-46b-(2)(l)(h) (1999)),
now makes and enters the following:
AUTHORITY
The authority of the Career Service Review Board to hold this step 5 hearing is found at Utah
Code, £67-19a-4Q6 (2000) and Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-1 etseq. (2000).
JSSUE
Was Grievant suspended for 20 days: (a) to advance the good of the public service; or (b) for
just cause? If not, what is the appropriate remedy?

0170

field on May 30, 1999; and violating UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-10 (Duty, Schedule and Area)
by leaving an assigned duty area and being in afieldnext to a tractor on August 19,1999. Charges
relating to submitting a late incident report were not sustained.
5. Grievant "appealed" the Department's Findings of Fact and Recommendation of a 30-day
suspension. By letter dated May 25,2000, to Grievant, Commissioner Craig L.Dearden reduced the
30-day suspension to 20 days and ordered a fitness for duty psychological examination as well as a
transfer to a new section.
6. Trooper Pace received performance evaluations for the years 1990 through 1998 which
were all rated "successful" or "exceptional" with no objectives being rated "unsuccessful." His
performance review for the period July 1,1997 through June 30,1998 was typical in its assessment
with such comments as, "Ross has done a fantastic job this year. He leads the crew in drunk driving
arrests. Ross is dependable. I know that he will be out when he is scheduled that there isn't a
situation that could arise where he wouldn't use common sense and good judgment. I have been
very impressed with how Ross handles accident scene management and the investigation. I rely on
Ross to be the O.I.C. when I am away and I appreciate the opportunity to have Ross on my crew."
7. Grievant's performance review for the period July 1,1998, through June 31,1999, rated
him overall "successful." He received, however, three "unsaitisfactories" in the area of law
enforcement (consisting of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drug enforcement) as well
as knowledge and application of traffic laws and their general enforcement. He received seven
"exceptional" ratings. The employer commentary on the performance review indicated that Grievant
was a dependable trooper and that, "He could be counted upon to use sound judgment and common
sense in difficult circumstances." The review also specified that, "He will be expected to make
twelve DUI arrests in the upcoming evaluation year." Grievant's written employee comment read,
"there is no quota" and indicated his disagreement with his performance assessment.2
8. Trooper Pace's performance review for the period July 1, 1999, through June 30,2000,
rated him "unsuccessful" in more categories than "successful" and had no marks of "exceptional."
This performance review included such supervisory statements as "Ross' attitude toward the
enforcement aspect of his law enforcement job was terrible. Ross' attitude toward supervision was

2

One of Grievant's arguments was that if the high speed chase incident was so problematic, it should have been
noted in his performance review. It is axiomatic that an unresolved or ongoing disciplinary investigation should not be
included in performance evaluations.
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be positive they clearly understand the orders."
9. UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-10 (Duties, Schedule and Area) states in part that,
"employees are responsible to obtain a copy of their work schedule in a timely manner and
employees shall report promptly and remain on duty during the hours indicated on the duty schedule.
Employees shall remain in the assigned territory, unless the radio dispatcher assigns them elsewhere
or in case of emergency, or permission to leave the assigned area is granted by the immediate
supervisor."
10. Department of Public Safety Policy and Procedure VI-1 establishes standards of conduct
for sworn officers within the Department. It sates that if an officer is found guilty of violating any
of the regulations, the officer may be subject to disciplinary action.
11. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the Department's imposed discipline
is appropriate in this case.
DISCUSSION
Grievant testified that before the current charges were brought, he had worked in lawenforcement for nearly 22 years with only two complaints. Indeed, Trooper Pace's performance
evaluations, at least until 1999, rated his performance in glowing terms. His relationship with his
supervisors appeared to be one of mutual respect. Those relationships, and Trooper Pace's alleged
conduct, seemed to go sour beginning in 1999, and steadily declined at an alarming rate, resulting
in a recommendation for his termination in November 1999.
The personal and professional hostility and recalcitrant attitudes exhibited in this hearing
were palpable. At the step 4 hearing of this matter, the ALJ aptly observed, "Trooper Pace was not
notified early enough and strongly enough of the concern the Department had with his performance,
and the consequences if he failed to improve his performance. By the time the Department put
something in writing regarding the consequences of his poor performance, things were spinning out
of control and it was effectively too late for Trooper Pace to change and improve his performance."
The ALJ also observed, "the first entry put in writing by the Department notifying Trooper Pace that
he could be disciplined was the August 30,1999 letter informing him of the Department's intent to
suspend him for 30 days, By that time . . . things had reached a crisis stage." At the step 5 hearing,
Commissioner of Public Safety Craig L. Dearden testified that one of the reasons that Grievant was
transferred was to avoid the "personality problem between Trooper Pace and Lt. Hamilton." Those
in charge of Section Seven believe that Grievant has no respect for authority and was abusing his
Pace v. Public Safety, 18 CSRB/H.O. 262
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where discipline had been imposed on a basis of an officer failing to initiate a high speed pursuit.
Trooper Brown testified that an officer must be "right behind a vehicle with the lights activated" and
that the "violator must know that you are chasing him and fails to stop and that "in a lot of speeding
or chase cases, there is eye contact, but that is not enough." Based on the criteria he emphasized in
his testimony, Trooper Brown concluded that Grievant had not been involved in a high speed pursuit.
Testifying on his own behalf, Trooper Pace said that the chase occurred over several miles
of a winding and curving canyon road and that it was, "difficult to impossible to keep the violator
within sight." It was unclear to Grievant whether the violator realized that Trooper Pace was in
pursuit. Trooper Pace was adamant that he did not engage in a high speed pursuit because the chase
did not meet all the necessary criteria. He testified that only the pursuing officer could initiate and
decide whether a high speed pursuit was in progress or had occurred.
Grievant is correct when he says that there should be no discipline for an officer who fails
to initiate a high speed pursuit. Department Policy and Procedure 1-21 V.A.I states that any law
enforcement officer in a department vehicle with an operable emergency vehicle equipment and
radio mav£emphasis added) initiate a vehicular pursuit when the following criteria are met: (a) the
suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension through evasive or unlawful tactics; (b) the
suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the direction of the officer; and (c) the suspect's
actions are such that failure to pursue would further enhance the danger presented to the public. The
term "may" is permissive and clearly indicates that an officer can decide whether or not to initiate
a high speed pursuit. A failure to initiate a high speed pursuit is not, however, the basis for
imposition of discipline in this case. Rather, it is the way the chase was conducted that raises the
concerns. In a classic example of form over substance, Grievant neglects to take into account the
Department's interest in "regulating the manner in which vehicular pursuit is undertaken and
performed." See Department Policy and Procedure 1-211.ILIII.
There exists substantial evidence that supports a finding that a high speed pursuit took place
and that discipline was properly imposed.3 First, Judge Valerga, at the step 4 hearing, concluded that
3

Grievant contended that similar discipline had not been imposed in a similar matter involving Trooper Keith
Dockstader. Upon careful review of the testimony aqd documentary evidence relating to the Dockstader incident, I
concluded that there are too many differences to make a meaninful comparison. Trooper Dockstader has less than one
year's experience while Grievant has had over 22 years in law enforcement aind it would be unfair to apply the same
expectations in this particular context. Additionally, there is no evidence that the same facts underlying the choice to
pursue a speeding vehicle were present in the Dockstader case, e.g., eye contact, etc. Finally, the Dockstader incident
involved an accident and was reviewed by the Accident Review Board.
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failing to recognize that a high speed pursuit took place does not lessen the potential danger inherent
in the incident. During the chase, Trooper Pace made sporadic and incomplete contact with dispatch,
i.e., he announced that he might need some backup units. Grievant's explanation for the sporadic
and incomplete contact was that if the chase turned into a pursuit and the driver tried to evade arrest,
other units might be in a more advantageous position to apprehend the suspect or to assist
Trooper Pace. Grievant also testified that he was not in a position to maintain safe control of his
vehicle while notifying dispatch. The problem Grievant fails to acknowledge, however, was
summarized by Col. Greenwood: "By contacting dispatch with such incomplete information, other
troopers didn't know what they were expected to respond to or where they were supposed to be or
when they were expected to respond."5
The Pasillas Cafe Incident
Grievant is charged with violating an order and insubordination for his failure to check out
for a lunch break on October 29, 1999. Utah Administrative Code, R477-11-1(1 )(a), states that
employees may be disciplined for "noncompliance with . . . agency . . . policies . . . including .. .
workplace policies." Subsection (d) of that rule specifies that State employees can be disciplined
for insubordination. UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-6 states that, "employees shall carry out all lawful
orders and shall at all times punctually and promptly perform all appointed duties and to attend to
all matters within the scope of their office." Several months prior to this incident, Lt. Hamilton
issued a memorandum to UHP Section Seven personnel informing them, among other things, that
officers should check out for their breaks. Sgt. Peterson testified that he had sat down with each of
the officers in Section Seven after Lt Hamilton's memo was issued and talked to them about the
importance of checking out on breaks. Grievant did not deny that he had seen the memo nor did he
deny that he had discussed the memo with Sgt. Peterson. Sgt. Peterson testified that Section Seven
personnel had become the "laughing stock" of the Department due, in part, to some of its officers'
frequent and extended breaks while on duty. He also said that dispatch complained that they had
major problems contacting some officers while they were supposed to be on duty and available.6

Grievant testified that the winding road, high speed and unfamiliarity with a new police vehicle made it very
difficult for him to safely and effectively communicate with dispatch. It is clearly a balancing act when an officer finds
him or herself in such a dangerous situation. Choices which comply with rules, regulations and policies may include
terminating a high speed chase or slowing down sufficiently to use radio equipment safely. What choice is not available,
at least not without violating poticy, is to engage in a high speed pursuit without notifying dispatch.
In Sgt. Peterson's words, his crew was commonly referred to by others as "retired while on duty."
Pace v. Public Safety, 18 CSRB/H.O. 262
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Department did not refute this testimony. Trooper Brown further testified, however, that he "had
received discipline" for his failure to attend the meeting/
It is clear that Grievant missed the meeting that he was told to attend and did not make up
the meeting. It is unclear whether there was another meeting that he could attend. Just because the
opportunity to mitigate the "damage" did not present itself, however, does not mean that Grievant
is not responsible for his lack of compliance. Notwithstanding his exemplary record in the past,
there is substantial evidence to sustain the charge.
The May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident
Grievant is charged with violating Department Policies and Procedures VI-1-6-10 and UHP
Rule and Regulation 3-1-10 by leaving his assigned duty area and working in his farm field on
May 30, 1999. This incident occurred before Lt. Hamilton's July 1999 memo concerning taking
breaks without checking out and before Sgt. Peterson's follow-up discussions with the officers in
Section Seven. At the step 4 hearing, the ALJ sustained this charge.
Two troopers, Chris Simmons and Mike Loveland, testified about the May 30 incident
Trooper Simmons was listening to his radio and testified that he heard "several security checks for
Badge 125 (Trooper Pace) where no one responded."8 As he passed by Trooper Pace's farm field,
he saw "someone" but was unable to identify the individual. Trooper Loveland testified that he also
heard the same security checks and that as he passed the same field with trooper Simmons, he saw
an individual whom he identified as Trooper Pace. At the same time that Badge 125 responded to
a security check, Trooper Loveland saw the person in the field reach into his coverall pocket and put
out either a cell phone or a walkie talkie and speak. When questioned, Trooper Loveland admitted
he had been traveling about 65 miles per hour and that he had been approximately 100 yards away
from the individual. Trooper Loveland, however, was positive that it was Trooper Pace he saw
working in the field and not Grievant's brother, Kent Pace, whom he also knew.

It appeared at the hearing that Trooper Brown had originally been given a 5-day suspension for missing the
section meeting, taking a lunch break with Trooper Pace without checking out at the Pasillas Cafe and for making "rude
comments." It also appeared that the 5-day suspension was reduced to a one-day suspension for all these infractions.
8

There was incomplete and somewhat confusing testimony about problems with dispatch relating to missed
or dropped calls and transcribing radio logs. The evidence presented on either side was inconclusive and I therefore
do not consider it in this discussion. There is also some discrepancy as to whether Simmons and Loveland were
requested to check upon or were^'spying" on Trooper Pace (presumably because he was not responding to his radio
calls) or whether they just happened by on their way home. For purposes of determining whether discipline is
appropriate in this incident, however, it is irrelevant.
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Grievant to stay out of his farm fields. Sgt. Peterson testified that on or about August 12,
Lt. Hamilton gave this order Lt. Hamilton testified that, "at a meeting on August 12th and prior to
leaving on vacation," he told Grievant that he "did not want him in the fields anymore and to get
clearance from the Sargent if he needed to do so and then make up the time." Lt. Hamilton testified
that while he usually writes down verbal orders, he did not document this order and could not recall
exactly where he had given the order. Grievant did not deny that he had been given a verbal
directive by Lt. Hamilton on August 12, to stay out of his fields. His defense appears to be that there
is no written record of the meeting and that Lt. Hamilton could not remember all the details relating
to the meeting when the order was issued, e.g., whether it was on a break or in the office.
There is substantial evidence to sustain this charge. Grievant does not dispute being in the
field on August 19. Neither does he dispute that prior to the incident, he was given a verbal order
by Lt. Hamilton. He may not have been working on a tractor, and it only may have been for a short
period time to pick up or drop off his son, but nevertheless, he was in the field.
DECISION
There is substantial evidence to support the 20-day suspension imposed by the Department
in this matter.
DATED this 20th day of December 2000.

Katherine A. Fox
Hearing Officer
Career Service Review Board

RECONSmERATIO N
Any request for reconsideration must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days
upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21-(12)(b).
APPEAL
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must befiledwith the Career Service Review Board within ten
working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code, Subsection 67-19a-407(l)(a)(i).
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